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Race as a Tool in the Struggle for Political
Mastery: North Carolina's "Redemption"
Revisited 1870-1905 and 2011-2013
Michael Kent Curtist
"[Reconstruction in North Carolina was an episode when]
selfish politicians, backed by the federal government, for party
purposes attempted to Africanize the State and deprive the
people through misrule and oppression of most that life held
dear."
J.G. de Roulhac Hamilton,
Reconstruction in North
Carolina (1914)
Here Mr. Hamilton is expounding the predominant-White-
Southern elite view of Reconstruction, the interracial experiment
in which, for a time, North Carolina tried democracy. By
Hamilton's account, North Carolina was "redeemed" when the
experiment in multi-racial democracy was finally overthrown
around 1898-1900.
Abstract. The use of race as a tool in the struggle for political
dominance was a method used to disrupt the Black-White
Republican coalition and multi-racial coalitions in the 1870s and
for many, many years following. The attack on democracy during
and after Reconstruction was never simply about race. Race was a
tool used in the struggle for political dominance. As this Paper
will show, race, including racial redistricting, was also a key tool
used by the Republican majority in the 2011 North Carolina
General Assembly.
For 2011 and for the future, this Paper focuses in part on the
revision and bulking up of selected legislative and congressional
districts in North Carolina's 2011 redistricting-"steroid districts"
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that were selected for increased segregation by concentrating and
increasing their African American voting age population and
diminishing their White voting age population. These "steroid
districts" were ones that were already, about 90% of the time,
electing candidates preferred by African American voters.
Specifically, the legislature revised 40% or 40%+ Black voting age
population (BVAP) districts by adjusting district lines to move in
more African Americans in order to create 50% or 50%+ Black
voting age population districts. Its redrawn lines also shipped
Whites or other non-Blacks out of the districts. These newly
transformed districts (1) were not needed to produce very strong
opportunity for the election of Blacks in those districts; (2) were
not required or justified by a proper reading of Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act with its reference to equal opportunity for
minorities to elect candidates of their choice and its rejection of
requiring Blacks in the legislature in proportion to the Black
voting age population; (3) eliminated virtually every prior district
where a multi-racial coalition had been electing the candidate of
choice of Black voters and replaced these districts with more
segregated districts; (4) diminished overall Black influence in the
legislature by undermining Black-White coalitions in districts
where Whites and others had supported Blacks but also in
districts where Blacks supported Whites; (5) achieved all these
effects by explicit use of racial quotas and numerical targets and
by including or excluding voters and sometimes candidates from
districts because of race; and (6) wasted Black votes by packing
more Black voters into these districts, serving no legitimate
remedial purpose.
The question raised by the creation of these "steroid districts"
is not whether Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act requires the
creation of coalition districts. Instead the question, not yet
answered by the Supreme Court of the United States, is this:
Does the systematic and unnecessary destruction of coalition
districts by racial quotas violate the Fourteenth Amendment?
Under the doctrine of constitutional avoidance-reading statutes
to avoid serious constitutional questions when reasonably
possible-and based on the text of the Voting Rights Act, and in
light of the history of past attacks on biracial coalitions in North
Carolina, the courts should not construe the Act to require or
justify this sort of gratuitous segregation. But, if the Voting
Rights Act is construed to produce these results, its application is
unconstitutional as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of
[Vol. 33: 53
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the Fourteenth Amendment-unconstitutional as applied to create
or justify these "steroid districts."
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Introduction: Representative Democracy, Gerrymanders in
General, and a Racial Gerrymander in North Carolina
After 2010
This Article provides an overview of recent changes in North
Carolina electoral politics and law since the 2010 election. It
focuses on the devices the General Assembly's post-2010
Republican majority used in its effort to secure political mastery
now and in the foreseeable future. Putting these changes in
historical and legal context, this Article highlights the
fundamental issues of democracy, gerrymanders, race, and history
raised by these changes. In terms of historical context, the
struggle to overthrow multi-racial (male) democracy in North
Carolina from 1870 to the turn of the century was never simply
about race.1 Instead, race was a tool used to disrupt White-Black
political coalitions and to secure political mastery for the
oligarchic, anti-coalition party.2 The 2010-2011 story is relevant
beyond North Carolina; instead, it exemplifies a larger and more
profound phenomenon.
The story that follows begins with fairly current events, then
looks at them in light of history and then analyzes them in a
modern context, and finally looks at some of the legal issues
involved in the 2011 North Carolina redistricting.
Part I. Overview: North Carolina, the Election of 2010, and
Its Consequences
In the 2010 off-year election, North Carolina, for the first
time in more than a century,3 elected a Republican majority in
both houses of the state legislature, and in 2012, the state also
elected a Republican governor.4 In the lower house of the North
Carolina General Assembly, the House of Representatives,
Republicans won sixty-seven seats and Democrats won forty-six.
5
1. See MICHAEL PERMAN, STRUGGLE FOR MASTERY: DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN
THE SOUTH, 1888-1908 (2001).
2. Id.
3. Lynn Bonner & Michael Biesecker, GOP Takes the General Assembly,
NEWSOBSERVER.COM (Nov. 3, 2010), http://www.newsobserver.com/2010/11/03/77
7711_gop-takes-the-general-assembly.html?rh=1.
4. Stephanie Strom, State Highlights, N.Y. TIMES (2012), http://elections
.nytimes.com/2012/results/states/north-carolina.
5. North Carolina State Board of Elections, Election Results, 2010 General
Election, available at http://www.ncsbe.gov/ncsbe/Elections/Election-Results-Dis
play?ED1=11xx02xx2010&EL1=GENERAL&YR1=2010&CR1=A [hereinafter
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In the state Senate, Republicans won thirty-one seats and
Democrats won nineteen. In the 2010 North Carolina
congressional elections, Democratic candidates won seven seats
and Republican candidates won six seats.'
The 2010 Republican success was quite an achievement. It
was achieved under a redistricting plan put into effect by
Democrats after the 2000 election. As recently as 2009, the
Democratic edge in the state House of Representatives had been
sixty-eight to fifty-two and in the state Senate thirty to twenty.8
Fresh from its 2010 electoral triumph, the Republican
legislature redistricted both the state legislature and North
Carolina's congressional districts. The results of this
breathtaking gerrymander were dramatic. In 2012, Republicans
won seventy-seven seats in the state House (a gain of ten since
2010) to forty-three seats for Democrats. 0 In the state Senate,
Republicans won thirty-three seats (a gain of three since 2010),
compared to seventeen for the Democrats."
In 2012, North Carolina Republicans won, on a statewide
basis, a slim majority of the popular vote for the General
Assembly, but not for Congress. 12 The 2012 congressional election
shows how effective the Republican gerrymander of North
Carolina was in giving majorities of voters a minority of
congressmen: North Carolina Democrats won a bit more than half
the statewide congressional vote total (outpolling Republicans by
2,218,357 to 2,137,167),13 but Republicans won nine of the thirteen
congressional seats.14 Meanwhile, Republicans in 2012 won a
majority of the combined popular votes for the state legislature,
about 53% .15 Republican map-drawing skills translated this 53%




8. See infra Figure 1 General Assembly Party Affiliations and Appendix B.
9. Ari Berman, How the GOP Is Resegregating the South, THE NATION (Jan.
31, 2012), http://www.thenation.com/article/165976/how-gop-resegregating-south#.
10. North Carolina State Board of Elections, Election Results, 2012 General










Representatives seats and 66% of the state Senate seats." The
following chart, which includes statistics on race, demonstrates
the shift in political balance between 2009 and 201317:
Figure 1*
2009 30t 20 M a 2
[20OW, W] j[4 W, 22 BI
21011 19 3 1 52 6
[12 W, 131 [33W l19Br]
2013 17 33 43 7
17 W, 0131 121 W, 221B1
*One Native American and one Hispanic were identified by
legislative statistics in 2009. In 2011 and 2013, one Native
American was identifed. Party affiliation of these legislators was
not noted.
North Carolina Republicans used techniques Republicans
had pioneered elsewhere. 8 The well-crafted gerrymander plus
election "reforms" is an effective tool in the struggle for political
mastery and an effective tool for taming future recalcitrant
numerical majorities including, and perhaps especially, a majority
coalition of minorities and "Whites."19  At any rate, the
gerrymander can secure seats a party otherwise could not win. 20
Once the state legislature is gerrymandered, it can continue to
16. See infra Figure 1 and note 17.
17. See generally N.C. Gen. Assemb., Senate Documents, http://www.ncleg.net
/Senate/Senate.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2014) (demographic data compiled of
elected Senators from 2009, 2011, and 2013); N.C. Gen. Assemb., House
Documents, http://www.ncleg.net/House/House.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2014)
(demographic data compiled of elected House Representatives from 2009, 2011, and
2013); see infra N.C. Gen. Assemb. Party Affiliations, Appendix A, http://www
.ncleg.net/library/Documents/GAPartyAffiliations.pdf.
18. See, e.g., STEVE BICKERSTAFF, LINES IN THE SAND: CONGRESSIONAL
REDISTRICTING IN TEXAS AND THE FALL OF TOM DELAY (2007) (detailing
concentration of minority voters and plans to decimate "Anglo" Democratic
congresspersons).
19. See infra note 20.
20. See supra notes 12-18 and accompanying text. See infra Appendix B for
maps of gerrymandered states and comparison with congressional vote totals. For
more detailed effects on certain districts, see SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE
LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 920-24 (2d ed.
2002) (demonstrating how the Alabama state Republican party used the re-
districting process to "pack" Black voters into particular districts, thus preserving
Congressional seats elsewhere in the state that the Republicans would not
otherwise then have had the numbers to hold).
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gerrymander itself and congressional districts in succeeding ten-
year (or sooner in some states 21) redistricting. 2 (See Appendix B
for maps from North Carolina and other states illustrating this
point.) A key tool in the North Carolina anti-coalition party's
struggle for political mastery was racial redistricting. Another
was changes in North Carolina election laws.
A. Racial Redistricting
In 2011, the North Carolina legislature packed more Blacks
into selected districts.2 3 The result was that fewer districts had a
substantial Black population of voting age, but more of the
remaining districts were more heavily African American-50% or
over 50%.24 Before 2011, at least seventeen legislative and two
congressional districts had been handily electing Black candidates
or the preferred candidate of Black voters-without the increase to
50% or 50%+ Blacks of voting age. As explained below, the main
effect of bulking up these African American districts was the
creation of super-safe majority-minority districts and to "bleach"
the remaining districts. So a few more super-safe African
American districts were created.26
The districts slated to be transformed and bulked up had
been multi-racial coalition districts-districts where a coalition
was electing the candidate preferred by Black voters-typically a
Black candidate. 7 Coalition districts where a multiracial coalition
had been electing Whites were decimated. 8
21. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006)
(holding that the Texas legislature's decision to scrap a court-drawn redistricting
plan and create a new one in the middle of the last decade did not, by itself, rise to
the level of an Equal Protection violation). State constitutions may bar the tactic
unless the Supreme Court decides that approach is forbidden by the federal
Constitution. See, e.g., People ex rel. Salazar v. Davidson, 79 P.3d 1221 (Colo.
2003) (holding that the Colorado Constitution prohibited the state General
Assembly from redistricting more than once per decade).
22. ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 20, at 920-24.
23. See Sharon McCloskey, Redistricting 2011: A Solution in Search of a
Problem, N.C. POL'Y WATCH (Feb. 27, 2013, 10:41 AM), http://www.ncpolicywatch
.com/2013/02/27/redistricting-2011-a-solution-in-search-of-a-problem/. See, e.g.,
infra text of note 33.
24. See id.
25. Lichtman Second Affidavit at 24, Dickson v. Rucho, No. 11-CVS-16896
(N.C. Super. Ct. 2012) [hereinafter Lichtman Second Aff.].
26. Id.
27. Id. See McCloskey, supra note 23.
28. See, e.g., supra Figure 1 and note 17 and accompanying text. Garrou




The explicitly stated goal of the Republican legislative
leadership was to have a percent of Black representatives in the
legislature that matched the percent of Blacks in the voting age
population." So Republicans in the legislature had a dual quota.
First, the nineteen districts had to be reconfigured to have enough
Black voters (50% or 50%+) in the new districts. This required
sorting voters by race-by adjusting district lines to move more
Black voters in and to kick out more voters who were not Black.
The second quota sought proportional representation for
African Americans in the state legislature-a percent of legislators
to mirror the percent of Black voting age population of North
Carolina." In one case, in pursuit of the quota for Black
legislators, a White female state Senator who had been the
preferred candidate of Black voters in her district was moved out
of her district-a move that admittedly would not have been made
had she been a Black incumbent senator.31 By its quota for Black
Democrats, the legislature was able to limit the number of elected
White Democrats, greatly limiting the number of those White
Democrats who could form coalitions with Blacks. 2
The legislature's redistricting reconfigured and bulked up
nineteen state House and Senate coalition districts and several
coalition congressional districts that were handily electing
candidates preferred by Black voters. (These coalition districts
were districts where African Americans were less than 50% of the
voting age population of the district but could, and around 90% of
the time did, elect their candidate of choice thanks to a multiracial
coalition.) The elimination of these districts as coalition districts
29. See Carolina Proportionality Chart prepared for Defendants, Dickson v.
Rucho, No. 11-CVS-16896 (N.C. Super. Ct. 2012) [hereinafter Proportionality
Chart].
30. See id.
31. Garrou Aff. at 6, Dickson v. Rucho, No. 11-CVS-16896 (N.C. Super. Ct.
2012); Rucho Deposition at 193:9-192, Dickson v. Rucho, No. 11-CVS-16896 (N.C.
Super. Ct. 2012) [hereinafter Rucho Dep.].
32. See Berman, supra note 9.
33. See Lichtman Second Aff. at 6-7, 20-25, Dickson v. Rucho, No. 11-CVS-
16896 (N.C. Super. Ct. 2012) (discussing the eleven coalition districts and the
chance of success for the candidate of choice for the Black community). By the 2011
redistricting, two House Districts with 37.395% to 36.95% Black voting age
population (BVAP) were also bulked up to 50%+ BVAP districts. Two districts that
had 35.88% and 34.91% BVAP were also bulked up to 45%+ BVAP. Id. at 24. Six
districts that had a significant 32.57% to 30.15% BVAP were eliminated from the
list of districts having 30%+ BVAP. Id. This eliminated districts where coalitions
were quite likely to elect White Democrats. In eleven state House Districts in
elections in 2008 and 2010 with 40%+ BVAP African Americans had a 90% chance
of electing the candidate of their choice, indeed a chance as good in districts 50% or
more Black. Id. at 6-7.
[Vol. 33: 53
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and replacing them as Black majority districts was done in spite of
the smashing successes of African Americans in districts with a
voting age population that was significantly less than 50% Black-
districts with 40% or more but less than 50% or above Black.34
The state and individual defendants in North Carolina
sought to justify the newly bulked up "steroid districts" and racial
proportionality by Sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act.35
Where Section 2 requires the creation of a majority-minority
Section 2 district as a remedy for the inability of Blacks to have an
equal opportunity to elect candidates of their choice" (to be
discussed below), the controlling plurality opinion of the Court
holds (as a matter of Voting Rights Act law-the constitutional
question was not raised) the district must have at least 50% or
50%+ BVAP. 7 Of course, whether a district with a majority of
Black voters is required or justified by the Voting Rights Act in
districts where Black candidates or those Blacks prefer are
winning without it, is a pertinent question. Another is whether
the Fourteenth Amendment permits these racial quotas and
sorting of voters by race in cases where the quotas and sorting are
not needed to assure African Americans an equal opportunity to
elect representatives of their choice, a choice that may not
constitutionally be limited to members of their race. (Whites may
choose to support Black candidates and Blacks may choose White
candidates.) A related question is whether such racial quotas are
allowed at all. These issues are discussed in Parts V-VII below.
Republican leaders asserted that the changes were justified
by Sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act." One might see the
changes as an advance for Black rights since the changes had
produced a record number of Black legislators, producing a few
more than before. 0 Now, for the first time in history, the North
34. Id.
35. Brentin Mock, NAACP Appealing North Carolina Redistricting Rule,
FACING SOUTH (July 30, 2013), http://www.southernstudies.org/2013/07/naacp-
appealing-north-carolina-redistricting-rulin.html.
36. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2012).
37. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (deciding a challenge to North
Carolina multimember districts under the Voting Rights Act); Stephenson v.
Bartlett, 562 S.E.2d 377 (N.C. 2002) (holding redistricting plan invalid under state
constitution, since the district violated the whole county requirement of the state
constitution and was not justified by Sections 2 or 5 of the Voting Rights Act).
38. See, e.g., Dickson v. Rucho, No. 11-CVS-16896, 30-31 (N.C. Super. Ct. July
8, 2013); see infra note 557 and accompanying text.




Carolina legislature had African American representatives very
nearly in proportion to the Black voting age population.41
Still, African American representatives in the legislature
voted against the plan.42 Perhaps they viewed the "gift" as a
Trojan horse designed to pack Black voters, reduce their voting
power, and frustrate their ability to form coalitions with Whites.
Every Black representative opposed the redistricting.3 So did the
North Carolina chapter of the NAACP."
B. Revising Election Laws
In addition to its districting changes, the legislature made a
number of changes in North Carolina voting laws. There seems
to be little doubt that most of these changes disproportionally
disadvantaged African American voters.46 Pursuing its quotas, the
legislature split a record number of precincts or voting tabulation
districts. 7 The legislature also changed the law so votes cast in
the wrong precinct would not be counted even for races for which
these voters were clearly qualified to vote. 8
41. See Proportionality Chart, Dickson v. Rucho, No. 11-CVS-16896 (N.C.
Super. Ct. 2012).
42. See Patrick Gannon, Political Foes Unite to Oppose New Redistricting Map,
STAR NEWS ONLINE (July 25, 2011), http://www.starnewsonline.com/article/2011
0725/ARTICLES/110729795/1177?p= l&tc=pg.
43. Id.
44. See First Amended Complaint, North Carolina State Conference of
Branches of the NAACP v. North Carolina, 2011 WL 10451923 (N.C. Super. Ct.,
2011); Mock, supra note 35.
45. See, e.g., H.B. 589, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws (N.C. 2013) (cuts the number of
early voting days from seventeen to ten and also prohibits same-day registration);
Voter Information Verification Act, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 381 (N.C. 2013) (making
certain changes to North Carolina voting laws such as: reducing the number of
early voting days, prohibiting same-day registration, and allowing non-precinct
voter challenges).
46. For a detailed analysis, see Complaint at 29-50, United States v. North
Carolina, No. 1:13-CV-861 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 30, 2013) available at http://legaltimes.
typepad.com/files/doj-nc-complaint.pdf. Cf. Answer, United States v. North
Carolina, No. 1:13-CV-861 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 2, 2013).
47. See, e.g., Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Joint Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment at 89 106-07, Dickson v. Rucho, No. 11-CVS-16896 (N.C.
Super. Ct. 2012) (citing affidavits or depositon testimony by the legislature's
majority's "line drawing expert" admitting splitting precincts to increase Black
voting age population to 50% and to create total Black voting population districts);
Gary D. Robertson, New N.C. Law Cancels Ballots Cast in Wrong Precinct,
PILOTONLINE.COM (Aug. 18, 2013), http://hamptonroads.com/2013/08/new-nc-law-
cancels-ballots-cast-wrong-precinct.
48. See United States v. North Carolina, No. 1:13-CV-861, 39-47 (M.D.N.C.
Sept. 30, 2013); Robertson, supra note 47. Most of the recent changes related to
elections have been challenged. In September 2013, several lawsuits were filed in
the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina
[Vol. 33: 53
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The North Carolina legislature also reduced early voting days
from seventeen to ten, but also (following the Florida 2012 model)
extended the number of hours in the remaining days. 9 In Florida,
this gambit produced long lines and long delays.50  African
Americans disproportionally used early voting and especially
voting during the first eliminated week.5 1  The legislature also
eliminated same-day registration and early voting the Sunday
before the election, both disproportionally used by African
American voters. 2 It also eliminated straight-ticket voting.3
For 2016 and later years, the legislature required photo
identification, passing one of the strictest voter identification laws
in the nation. 4 Seven point four percent of African Americans do
not have a DMV-issued identification, compared to 3.8% of White
voters. In ten North Carolina counties, the DMV office is open
only once a month.56  Four of these counties are predominantly
57African American.
challenging North Carolina Session Law 2013-381, a statute that imposes new
restrictions on North Carolina's voters. The district court's order denying a
preliminary injunction was appealed to the Fourth Circuit. The circuit court
enjoined several of the changes, a decision subsequently stayed by the United
States Supreme Court. For details see, North Carolina v. League of Women Voters
of North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 6 (2014); League of Women Voters of North Carolina
v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224 (4th Cir. 2014); United States v. North Carolina,
No. 1:13-CV-861 (M.D.N.C. 2013).
49. Id.
50. See Juliet Lapidos, Florida Voting: Like 'a Third-World Country', N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 5, 2012, 1:41 PM), http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/05/
florida-voting-like-a-third-world-country?_r=0.
51. See Michael C. Herron & Daniel A. Smith, Race, Party, and the
Consequences of Restricting Early Voting in Florida in the 2012 General Election,
67 POL. RES. Q. 646 (2014).
52. See Voter Information Verification Act, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 381, 16 (N.C.
2013) (cutting the number of early voting days from seventeen to ten and also
prohibiting same-day registration).
53. Id. at 38.
54. See id. See also Complaint at 39-42, United States v. North Carolina,
No. 1:13-CV-861 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 30, 2013).
55. Complaint at 16, 50, United States v. North Carolina, No. 1:13-CV-861
(M.D.N.C. Sept. 30, 2013).
56. Id. at 48. See Paul Wooverton, Justice Department Sues North Carolina
over New Voting Laws, FAYOBSERVER.COM (Oct. 1, 2013, 5:48 AM), http://www.fay
observer.com/news/local/justice-department-sues-north-carolina-over-new-voting-
laws/article bf5a78be-6441-55a7-93b5-33e8b5516a48.html (discussing numerous
restrictions on early voting and noting that DMVs in ten counties are only open
once per month).




The legislature changed the law to allow out-of-precinct
voters to challenge voters.5 8  Additional challenges, though not
successful, can delay voting, imposing a particular hardship on
poor voters and those whose work or family responsibility
schedules preclude standing in line all day. The elimination of
straight-ticket voting is also likely to produce longer lines.
C. The Effects of These Changes on Black Political Power
and Multi-racial Coalitions
Creation of minority-majority districts has helped in the past
to increase the number of Americans of African descent in the
North Carolina state legislature and in state legislatures
throughout the South and nation.59 But is the current use of racial
districting by packing additional Black voters into "Black" districts
in districts where before Blacks were winning handily without
such packing a means to any legitimate end? No.
One effect of pouring more Blacks into semi-segregated Black
districts is to bleach the surrounding districts and to make them
more Republican. 0 To the extent that Blacks are crowded into a
smaller number of more racially-concentrated Black districts, the
effect is to impair Black-White coalitions in other districts with
substantially more Whites. 1 Districts that could have provided
successful Democratic White-Black coalitions are reduced. 2 The
effect overall is to reduce Black political power and influence in
the legislature by unnecessarily concentrating more Black voters
in quasi-segregated districts.
Thomas Edsall, in an article on the decline of Black power in
the South, notes that a growing number of Blacks in state
legislatures has coincided with a decline in Black political power. 4
With typically all-White-Republican-Party takeovers in the South,
Blacks in state legislatures have been relegated to minority status
and lost committee chair positions, losing power to set agendas,
58. H.B. 589, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 381, 20 (N.C. 2013).
59. Thomas B. Edsall, The Decline of Black Power in the South, N.Y. TIMES





63. Lichtman First Affidavit, Dickson v. Rucho, 11-CVS-16896 (N.C. Super. Ct.
2012) [hereinafter Lichtman First Aff.]; Lichtman Second Aff. at 24, Dickson v.
Rucho, No. 11-CVS-16896 (N.C. Super. Ct. 2012); see also Edsall, supra note 59.
64. Edsall, supra note 59.
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push legislation to the floor, and call hearings. In North Carolina
before the 2010 election, Blacks were committee chairs and North
Carolina had had a Black Speaker of the House. On substantive
issues of personal concern to Blacks and less wealthy Whites and
their allies, changes have been substantial. 7
With their currently entrenched White majorities, as Edsall
explains, Republicans are moving aggressively to secure their
state legislative majorities from future majorities of voters-
majorities made up a coalition in which ethnic minorities may be
the majority in the coalition. 8 The effort combines gerrymanders
with efforts to suppress the minority and Democratic vote "under
the guise of combating voter fraud."9 "Republicans in control of
redistricting," Edsall explains:
[H]ave two goals: the defeat of [W]hite Democrats, and the
creation of safe districts for Republicans. They have achieved
both of these goals by increasing the number of districts likely
to elect an African-American. Black voters are gerrymandered
out of districts represented by [W]hites of both parties, making
the Democratic incumbent weaker and the Republican
incumbent stronger.70
Or, when that seems impractical and the White legislator cannot
be easily carved out of the district, White incumbents can have
Black majorities added to their districts to increase the possibility
of an African American challenging the White incumbent."
"In private discussions," Edsall reports, "Republicans in the
South talk explicitly about their goal of turning the Democratic
Party into a [Bilack party, and in many Southern states they have
succeeded.7 12 So giving the Democratic Party a predominantly
Black face is designed to polarize the Southern electorate into a
Black (Democratic) minority and White (Republican) majority.
Aggressive racial districting uses race as a polarizing tool, and
advances Republican control of Southern legislatures. So far it is
working well throughout the South.4
65. Id.
66. E.g., Senator Dan Blue, http://danblue.org/aboutlsenator-blue (last visited
Nov. 18, 2014). Blue, an African American, was Speaker of the House from 1991 to
1994.






73. Id.; Berman, supra note 9.
74. Edsall, supra note 59.
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North Carolina seems to be following a similar plan to the
one pioneered in Texas by Tom DeLay and Karl Rove.5 That plan
succeeded in eliminating "Anglo" congressmen.6 Indeed, by the
Texas Republican playbook, a district that was majority Hispanic
and that elected an Anglo, was labeled "non-performing" and
slated for reconstructive surgery. In Texas, Karl Rove helped to
engineer large infusions of cash for Republican legislative
candidates.8 In North Carolina, large infusions of cash were
orchestrated by multi-millionaire Art Pope, now Governor Pat
McCrory's budget director. Of course, when a party wins control
of the legislature it can and sometimes does dramatically change
the law.86
So discussion of the fact that the North Carolina legislature
has changed the law in ways opposed by African Americans and
their allies may seem out of place. However, where racial
districting like that in 2011 could be justified as a major advance
for political power for Americans of African descent, it may be
worthwhile to look at the record.
D. The Effect of the Republican Legislative Agenda on
Issues of Concern to Most Black Americans and Their
Allies
Republican changes injure poor citizens of every race, and
disproportionately injure many North Carolina Americans of
African descent. 1 The following is a list of some changes made by
the current Republican legislature and governor, including a
number summarized by Rob Christensen in a June 15, 2013
75. Compare Edsall, supra note 59 and Berman, supra note 9 (explaining how
North Carolina's 2010 Republicans created districts with even higher percentages
of African Americans to garner political advantage for the GOP), with
BICKERSTAFF, supra note 18, at 263-64 (discussing Texas redistricting in which
Republican map drawers "us[ed] Republican political advantage to the maximum
extent possible to draw partisan districts that would defeat Anglo Democrats").
76. BICKERSTAFF, supra note 18, at 263-64.
77. Id. at 262-65.
78. Wayne Slater, Karl Rove: How to Build a Multi-Million Dollar Money
Machine, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Feb. 12, 2012, 8:02 PM), http://trailblazersblog.
dallasnews.com/2012/02/karl-rove-how-to-build-a-multi.html/.
79. Jim Morrill, McCrory's First Task: Building a New Team, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER (Jan. 5, 2013), http://www.newsobserver.com/2013/01/05/2583546-
mccrorys-first-task-building-a.html?rh=l.
80. See, e.g., Rob Christensen, NC GOP Rolls Back Era of Democratic Laws,
RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER (June 16, 2013), http://www.newsobserver.com/2013/
06/16/2968241/state-gop-rolls-back-era-of-democratic.html (listing examples of
Republican changes that negatively impacted minority and poor citizens).
81. Id.
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Raleigh News and Observer article and recounted by Thomas
Edsall:
1. Repeal of North Carolina's Earned Income Tax Credit,
which provided tax benefits to the working poor.
8 2
2. Cuts in Medicaid eligibility for poor women, reducing the
pool of eligible recipients from pregnant women with
income 185% of the poverty level to pregnant women with
income at 133%.83
3. Rejection of Medicaid expansion resulting in contraction of
medical services for the poor."
4. Reduced eligibility for unemployment benefits from
twenty-six weeks to twelve to twenty weeks, depending on
circumstances. 5
5. Cutting funds for education by freezing teacher salaries (a
freeze that began in 2009), reducing the number of teacher
aides, eliminating a salary supplement for teachers who
obtain a master's degree, and eliminating a teaching
fellowship program that develops young teachers in rural
areas.6 In a later session, the legislature did provide a
significant raise largely limited to very new teachers.
6. Repeal of the 2009 Racial Justice Act. The Act allowed
death row inmates to challenge their sentences by arguing
that race played a factor in either their conviction or their
sentencing."
7. For 2016 and following elections, enactment of a voter ID
law, which requires voters to show some form of
government-issued photo identification before casting a
ballot. Studies tend to show that poor, elderly, and
African American voters disproportionately lack
government-issued IDs.8" For example, a recent study
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. John Frank, McCrory Signs Bill Blocking Medicaid Expansion, RALEIGH
NEWS & OBSERVER (Mar. 6, 2013), http://www.newsobserver.com/2013/03/06/
2730744 mccrory-signs-bill-blocking-medicaid.html?rh=1.
85. Christensen, supra note 80.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See Voter Information Verification Act, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 381 (N.C.
2013); see also David Zucchino, North Carolina Lawmakers Approve Sweeping
Voter ID Bill, L.A. TIMES (July 26, 2013, 5:06 PM), http://cached.newslookup.com
/cached.php?ref id=49&siteid=2040&id=2645615&t=1374884323 (discussing North
Carolina's 2013 Voter ID law requiring voters to show some form of government-
issued ID).
89. Zucchino, supra note 88.
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conducted by the North Carolina State Board of Elections
found that 107,681 registered African American voters do
not have a state-issued photo ID, as opposed to 172,613
registered White voters.0 However, there are only about
1,498,000 African Americans of voting age in North
Carolina, as opposed to about 5,156,000 Whites.91 Thus,
African Americans account for 34% of registered voters
who cannot show a state photo ID at the polls even though
they only make up 21% of the potential electorate. For
voters who do not have a driver's license or other photo ID,
the bill provides for a voter identification card that may be
obtained at the DMV.9 2  The statute provides that
registered voters and registered voters who swear they
lack an acceptable photo ID may receive one for free. Free
renewal does not seem to be specified.93
8. Cutting early voting and same-day registration and
eliminating early voting the Sunday before the election.94
The legislature maintained the same number of hours for
early voting but cut the days-following the model used by
Florida in 2012.
A proposal to delay restoration of the right to vote for felons for
five more years passed the Senate but in the end was not added to
the bill. One thing is clear: most of the voting measures along
90. See NCSBE 2012, supra note 10.
91. County Summary of Voting Age Population by Race and Ethnicity: 2011
NCGA Redistricting Database, NCGA, http://www.ncleg.netGIS/Download/Base_
Data/2011/ReportsfbyCounty/rptBaseCountyVap.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2014).
92. Voter Information Verification Act, ch. 163, sec. 3.1, § 20-37.7(d), 2013 N.C.
Sess. Laws 381 (N.C. 2013).
93. Id. For fees associated with a certified copy of a birth certificate or a special
ID, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-14 (2013).
94. Voter Information Verification Act, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 381 (N.C. 2013);
see also Zucchino, supra note 88.
95. S. 721, Gen. Assemb., part 2, sec. 2.1, § 13.1 (N.C. 2013) (proposing a five-
year waiting period before the right to vote is restored); see also Thomasi
McDonald, Proposal Would Make Ex-Felons Wait 5 Years to Vote, RALEIGH NEWS &
OBSERVER (Apr. 22, 2013), http://www.newsobserver.com/2013/0422/2843578-state
-senator-proposes-five-year.html?rh=l. The North Carolina Constitution currently
disfranchises persons convicted of a felony "unless the said person shall first be
restored to citizenship in the manner prescribed by law." N.C. CONST. art. IV, §
2(3). Under current North Carolina law, this right to citizenship is restored upon
completion of a prison sentence and probation. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 13-1 (2013).
Delaying the right to vote for those convicted of a felony would disproportionately
affect African Americans. For example, Blacks are almost four times more likely
than Whites with similar behavior to be arrested for marijuana offenses. EZEKIEL
EDWARDS ET AL., THE WAR ON MARIJUANA IN BLACK AND WHITE 4 (2013), available
at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/aclu-thewaronmarijuana-rel2.pdf; see also Harry
J. Enten, Felon Voting Rights Have a Bigger Impact on Elections Than Voter ID
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with the creation of bulked up Black districts are tools that reduce
the political power of Black, poor, and minority voters.96
By reducing the number of districts with a substantial Black
population, by packing more Blacks into fewer districts, by
decimating districts based on Black-White and multiethnic
coalitions, and decimating Blacks' White Democratic legislative
allies, the legislature's racial gerrymander left African American
legislators in a long-term minority with little power to shape laws
and little likelihood of resuming committee chairs or leadership
positions.97  Indeed, on issue after issue from the racial
gerrymander, to voting rights, and the social safety net, the
legislation of the new and then the newly entrenched majority has
been a disaster from the point of view of policies preferred by
Africans Americans and their allies. 8 This does not show the
legislative changes were unwise. That is an issue readers will
decide for themselves. It does show any claim that the racial
gerrymander was to benefit Americans of African descent is
dubious.
Part II. Transition: Forward to the Past
The transition that follows may strike readers as puzzling.
Having looked at recent election changes in North Carolina, the
next sections of this Paper look at these changes in historical
context. So far, the reader may conclude that Blacks in North
Carolina have been targeted by these myriad 2011-2013 election
"reforms." But even if the reader sees that pattern, she or he may
shrug and say, "So what? This is just politics. This is not like the
bad old days at all. Here, Blacks are targeted not because of their
color, but because they vote Democratic." The ho-hum reaction
assumes that targeting racial minorities to attain political ends is
not problematic. That understates the perniciousness of what is
going on. History helps to see why.
Laws, THEGUARDIAN.COM (July 31, 2013, 9:30 AM), http://www.theguardian.com
/commentisfree/2013/jul/31/felon-voting-rights-impact-on-elections (explaining how
strict felon voting laws can swing an election by drastically reducing the minority
vote).
96. See Mock, supra note 35 (discussing the impact of these voting changes on
political power).
97. See Edsall, supra note 59 (noting a general pattern in the South); Berman,
supra note 9 ("The use of race in redistricting is just one part of a broader racial
strategy used by Southern Republicans to ... make it more difficult for minorities
to vote and to limit their electoral influence.").
98. See, e.g., Christensen, supra note 80 (listing examples of Republican
changes that negatively impacted minority and poor citizens).
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The 2010-2012 story is about the use of racial districting and
voting "reforms" to disrupt the multi-racial Democratic coalition.
These methods produce more racially-polarized politics. The
2011-2013 racial gerrymander and changes in election laws that
disproportionally disadvantage African Americans and other
vulnerable voters are tools in the struggle for political mastery."'
The gerrymanders also have the usual effect of gerrymanders-
magnifying the representation of the party controlling the
gerrymander and often protecting it from future majorities for a
very long time." 10
The historic story that follows is also about the struggle for
political mastery.1 2  It is a story of the use of race to disrupt a
White-Black coalition and of targeting Black voters by election
"reforms" because they were the most vulnerable part of a biracial
coalition.0  But then the victims were Black and White
Republicans and other reformers.0 4 As history shows, using racial
means to disrupt White-Black coalitions and to undermine
effective democracy is not new.1 5  Of course, some can and do
argue that using race for political purposes seeking political
mastery sanitizes it as a legal matter.0 Use of racial tools
systemically to discourage Black voting and using it systematically
to undermine multi-racial political cooperation should not be
sanitized because it yields political benefits. But if it should, then
99. See, e.g., Edsall, supra note 59; Berman, supra note 9 (discussing how
North Carolina's redistricting "has changed the political complexion of North
Carolina" to create a White Republican majority and a Black Democratic minority).
100. See generally PERMAN, supra note 1 (describing disfranchisement in the
South as a "Struggle for Mastery"). Here the words are used to cover a longer
period.
101. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The Redistricting Cases: Original Mistakes
and Current Consequences, 24 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 103, 112-13 (2000)
(discussing the consequences of gerrymandering which include the creation of
"more homogenous districts," "insulation of incumbents from political
accountability," and "increased partisanship and extremism in legislative bodies").
102. PAUL D. ESCOTT, MANY EXCELLENT PEOPLE: POWER AND PRIVILEGE IN
NORTH CAROLINA, 1850-1900 at 148-51 (1985).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 148 ("Conservatives also began to appeal to the social self-interest of
the ordinary White. They stressed that all White people had an interest in the
continued debasement of the Negro. His subjection had been the fundamental fact
in the discriminatory social order of the Old South, and power over blacks had
constituted one of the rights that White people enjoyed.").
106. See generally Richard L. Hasen, Race or Party?: How Courts Should Think
About Republican Efforts to Make It Harder to Vote in North Carolina and
Elsewhere, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 58 (2014) (citing alternative "just politics"
argument by Texas to justify voting changes that disadvantaged minorities).
Hasen rejects such sanitation. Id.
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the overthrow of Reconstruction and Black disfranchisement
needs to be viewed in a new and more favorable light.
After Black men gained the vote under the North Carolina's
1868 Constitution, the anti-coalition "Conservative" party (later
calling itself the "Democratic" party) used racial targeting for
political purposes against the Republican Party's White-Black
(majority Black) coalition.0 7 Because the "Conservative" anti-
coalition party changed its name to the Democratic Party in the
1870s, and because the current Democratic Party is a multiracial
coalition party and the modern Republican Party in the South is
the anti-coalition party, I will often use the words anti-coalition
and coalition party to help the reader keep things straight. As the
name suggests, the anti-coalition group sought to disrupt a
biracial coalition."' In 1877, using racial appeals and politically-
motivated terror aimed at White and Black Republicans, the self-
styled anti-coalition "Conservatives," soon to be re-christened as
Democrats, regained control of the legislature and "redeemed" the
state. 9 In the years that followed, they continued to use race in
the struggle for political mastery-often by "reforming" voting
laws with devices that did not explicitly mention race, but
disproportionally burdened Black voters.1 Black voters were
targeted because they were a vulnerable and identifiable part of
the Republican coalition."1
In the 1890s, a fusion coalition between Populists and White
and Black Republicans briefly gained power.1 1 2 Once again, anti-
coalition Democrats used race and terror to regain power, and
then they used that power to further "reform" election laws and
then to disfranchise Black men. 13  Disfranchisement was
accomplished by various devices including literacy tests, the White
primary, partisan control of election machinery, segregation, and
107. See ESCOTT, supra note 102, at 150 ("The general strategy of the Democrats
or Conservatives ... was the same throughout the state. 'The lines of society are
being rigidly drawn,' [as one Conservative put it] ... 'all the Intelligence and
Virtue ... are with the Conservative party and they treat with contempt and scorn
the miserable wretches who have deserted their race' by voting Republican.").
108. Id.
109. HUGH TALMAGE LEFLER & ALBERT RAY NEWSOME, THE HISTORY OF A
SOUTHERN STATE: NORTH CAROLINA 465-73 (2d ed. 1963) (discussing how after
nearly a decade of troublous Reconstruction, "[t]he state had been 'redeemed,'
'home rule' had been restored, and [Conservative] 'White supremacy' had been
achieved").
110. Id. at 509-10.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 515-16.
113. Id. at 517-27.
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the poll tax.11 4  Disfranchisement was a political masterstroke
because it eliminated the major part of the Republican coalition. 15
Of course, racial appeals and segregation also helped to disrupt
labor and other coalitions as well.116
History never simply repeats itself. Current tactics are,
thankfully, by no means fully identical to historic tactics. Political
terror is not a weapon. The consistent thread tying the present to
the past is the use of partisan, racially skewed, electoral
manipulation (often effectuated by facially "neutral" rules that
disproportionally disadvantage Blacks) as a tool to undermine
multiracial coalitions. The effort to undermine White-Black
political coalitions and to discourage or otherwise disadvantage
Black voting in the search for political mastery, ties the past to the
present.
After looking at the destruction of White-Black coalitions, the
story moves on to the response of the Supreme Court. In general,
from the 1870s through the 1920s and beyond, the Court often
failed to protect democracy from terror and disfranchisement. 17
Indeed, it undermined congressional laws designed to protect
democracy. 8 Judges often suggested that political terror aimed at
114. Id. at 526-27.
115. See id. at 528-29 ("The adoption of the suffrage amendment [which imposed
a poll tax and literacy test] deprived the Republican party of about 50,000 voters,
confirmed Democratic dominance of state politics, and strengthened the one-party
system.").
116. DEBORAH BECKEL, RADICAL REFORM: INTERRACIAL POLITICS IN POST-
EMANCIPATION NORTH CAROLINA 61-63 (2011). For a leading study of
Reconstruction, see ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED
REVOLUTION 1863-1877 (Henry Steele Commager & Richard B. Morris eds., 1988).
117. See generally Michael Kent Curtis, Reflection on Albion Tourgee's View of
the Supreme Court: A "Consistent Enemy of Personal Liberty and Equality of
Right," 5 ELON L. REV. 19, 37-71 (2013) (Tourgee spoke about the 191h and early
201h Century Court); Michael Kent Curtis, The Klan, The Congress, and the Court:
Congressional Enforcement of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments & the
State Act Syllogism, a Brief Historical Overview, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1381, 1398-
1425 (2009) [hereinafter Curtis, The Klan] (recounting the dismal story); Richard
H. Pildes, Democracy, Anti-Democracy, and the Canon, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 295
(2000). He exaggerated; it was only usually an enemy of liberty and equal right.
James Gray Pope, Snubbed Landmark: Why United States v. Cruickshank Belongs
at the Heart of the American Constitutional Canon, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 385-
447 (2014). James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127 (1903) (applying the state action
syllogism to private attacks on the right to vote, at least in state elections); United
States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876) (construing federal statutory protection of the
right to vote since race was not reiterated in subsequent sections of the statute);
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875) (finding that constitutional
protections only apply to state, not private, actions, and that the right to assembly
in the First Amendment did not restrict state governments, and more importantly,
did not protect citizens against private terrorists).
118. Reese, 92 U.S. at 216.
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Black and White Republicans and facially neutral laws aimed at
Black voters were beyond the power of the Congress or the Court's
reach.119 After the 1870s, failure to protect democracy was often
systemic and included Congress and the Executive as well.
12
1
After bringing the story up through 1965, the focus shifts to
some of the legal issues raised by North Carolina's 2011 racial
gerrymander-issues under the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Voting Rights Act.1 2 But now I move to the earlier use of race in
the struggle for political mastery.
Part III. Post-Civil War and the 19th Century:
Reconstructions and the Reactions
A. Background
Slavery and its legacy shaped American politics under the
Nation's new Constitution, ratified in 1791.122 The Constitution
inflated the political power of the slave states by counting slaves
as three-fifths of a person for representation in the House of
Representatives and therefore also in the Electoral College.
12 3
"The federal ratio [of the Three-fifth's Clause] consistently
augmented southern representations in the House by 30 percent
or more., 124  To a truly remarkable degree, the new nation was
governed by slaveholders and their allies. The Supreme Court
became increasingly attentive to the wishes of the slaveholding
elite. 121
119. Id.
120. See, e.g., Curtis, The Klan, supra note 117 (recounting the dismal story).
121. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2012).
122. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (superseded by U.S. CONST. amend. XIII).
123. Id.
124. DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN
AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 20 (2001).
125. See generally LEONARD L. RICHARDS, THE SLAVE POWER: THE FREE NORTH
AND SOUTHERN DOMINATION, 1780-1860 at 10 (2000) ("Slaveholders generally were
in control.").
126. E.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857) (holding that African
Americans were not citizens, had no federal constitutional rights, could not sue in
federal court, and that the federal government had no power to ban slavery in the
federal territories), superseded by constitutional amendments, U.S. CONST. amends.
XIII and XIV; Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539 (1842) (holding that the fugitive
slave clause and a federal fugitive slave law guaranteeing a slaveholder the right to
recover an escaped slave preempted a Pennsylvania state law that protected
African Americans from being taken out of the state and into slavery without a due
process hearing to establish that the person seized was actually a fugitive slave
and not a free Black person).
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Critics referred to the augmented political power of slave
states as the "Slave Power," a power they felt was undermining
the republican nature of the American experiment.127  The
constitutions of a number of Southern states further inflated the
political power of slave owners by having little-state-three-fifths
clauses. For example, the North Carolina Constitution provided
that representatives in the lower house of the General Assembly
would be elected by counties "according to their federal
population"; thus, slaves would count as three-fifths of a person for
purposes of representation in the state House."' So slave owners
and their allies had extra power at the state level, which
translated to still more extra power at the national level." They
also enjoyed economic advantages from slavery.3 With the end of
the Atlantic slave trade in 1808, Southern slaveholders had a
lucrative commerce-selling slaves to new areas where slavery
was developing.
As the nation expanded, whether new territories were to be
free or slave (and thus become free or slave states) became a
divisive political issue.132  As opposition to slavery mounted,
Southern states suppressed anti-slavery speech and demanded
that the rest of the nation follow suit, but the demand was
generally rejected by the North.1 Southerners next demanded
that all federal territory be open to slavery.1 4 New slave territory
promised new lucrative markets for "surplus" slaves as well as
augmentation of the political "slave power" bloated by the Three-
fifths Clause. 15 But compliance with the demand to plant slavery
in all the federal territories sparked a political revolution in the
North, culminating in the election of Abraham Lincoln on a
platform that promised to tolerate slavery in the states where it
existed, but to ban it from all federal territory.136 Faced with what
127. RICHARDS, supra note 125, at 1-4.
128. N.C. CONST. of 1776 art. I, § 1, cl. 2 (amended 1835).
129. RICHARDS, supra note 125, at 56-57.
130. Id. at 71-72.
131. Id.
132. DAVID M. POTTER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS: 1848-1861 at 53-55 (Don E.
Fehrenbacher et al. eds., 1976).
133. MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, "THE PEOPLE'S DARLING PRIVILEGE":
STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY 182-94 (2000).
134. POTTER, supra note 132, at 53-54.
135. RICHARDS, supra note 125, at 32-88.
136. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 124, at 535-63. Only seven of the forty-four
Northern Democrats who had voted to repeal the Missouri Compromise that
opened national territory to slavery were re-elected in 1858; the Democratic Party
lost 70% of its free state seats. Id. at 188. See also Republican Party Platform of
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they saw as the threat that the slaveholding South would become
an ever-smaller minority in the national government, faced with
what they saw as a threat to slavery itself, and faced with what
they saw as a threat to its potential profits from selling slaves in




After the Confederate defeat, many in North Carolina's old
elite sought to preserve as much as possible of the pre-war system
and to resume their prior position in the state's hierarchy.1 3 ' For a
short time, North Carolina operated under Andrew Johnson's
effort at prompt restoration of the states of the Confederacy (with
increased representation in the federal House and Electoral
College based on counting 100% of the newly-freed slaves).139 The
Johnson reconstruction plan required the seceded states to call a
convention to establish a new state constitution which abolished
slavery and banned repayment of the state debt used in part to aid
the rebellion, but left much of the former federal system intact
(including broad state control over newly-freed slaves including
the power to deny them the right to vote). 40
At the call of Governor William W. Holden, a Convention
assembled in North Carolina to draft a new state constitution. 41
As President Andrew Johnson had insisted,4 2 the Convention's
proposed 1866 constitution abolished slavery and repudiated the
1860, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (May 17, 1860), available at http://www.presidency
.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29620 ("[TIhe new dogma that the Constitution, of its own force,
carries slavery into any or all of the territories of the United States, is a dangerous
political heresy, at variance with the explicit provisions of that instrument itself
.... [Olur Republican fathers, when they had abolished slavery in all our national
territory, ordained that 'no persons should be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law,' [and] it becomes our duty ... to maintain this
provision of the Constitution against all attempts to violate it; and we deny the
authority of Congress, of a territorial legislature, or of any individuals, to give legal
existence to slavery in any territory of the United States.").
137. See CHARLES B. DEW, APOSTLES OF DISUNION: SOUTHERN SECESSION
COMMISSIONERS AND THE CAUSES OF THE CIVIL WAR 18-36 (2001) (discussing
general consensus among Comissioners from the seceded states to slave states still
on the fence that secession was necessary to protect slavery and appealing to race
and slavery used to justify secession).
138. ESCOTT, supra note 102, at 85-86.
139. LEFLER & NEWSOME, supra note 109, at 453-54. With the abolition of
slavery, African Americans now counted towards the total basis of representation
in the former slave states. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
140. See LEFLER & NEWSOME, supra note 109, at 454-55.
141. Id. at 455.
142. Id. at 453-57.
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debt incurred in aiding the "War for Southern Independence" (as
one text quaintly describes it).143  It retained property
qualifications for election to the legislature, excluding many White
males from service in the state House and more from service in the
state Senate.4  It substituted a White basis for representation in
the state House, a rule which did not count disfranchised free and
emancipated Blacks. It did not allow any Black voting or office
holding.
1 46
Still, leading "Conservatives" found the proposed constitution
unacceptable.1 4 7  Among other things, leading "Conservatives"
objected to repudiating the war debt.1 48 Some "Conservatives" also
hoped to restrict the White voting population to the "better" sort,
even rolling back democratic advances of the 1850s. 14 9 Thomas
Ruffin, a leading "Conservative" opponent of the proposed
constitution, insisted that the war had changed nothing: the prior
North Carolina government should simply be reinstated.1 50  He
also objected to the failure to count newly-freed, but disfranchised,
slaves as persons for purposes of representation in the
legislature-his plan would again swell the power of the old
slaveholding elite. Many "Conservatives" found the proposed
constitution too radical, and voters rejected it at the polls.15 2
As Paul Escott explains in his classic book, Many Excellent
People, most of the White elite's "fear of change revealed that
Reconstruction was more than a contest over racial equality-it
was a battle against the principle of equality itself.1 5 4 What would
be the nature and extent of political equality among White and
Black males, and what would be the nature and extent of economic
equality? In the first two years after the war, "[b]efore meaningful
equality for Blacks became an issue, most of the state's traditional
leaders had begun to draw together in defense of the fundamental
principle of hierarchy against [greater] democracy. To them the
143. Id. at 426. In their comprehensive history of North Carolina, Lefler and
Newsome use these words as the title of the chapter on the Civil War. Id.
144. ESCOTT, supra note 102, at 105-08.
145. Id. at 105.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 107-08.
148. Id. at 96-98.
149. Id. at 84.
150. Id. at 108.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 109-10.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 85.
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immediate danger was a shift of power from prominent to
supposedly undeserving Whites. 1
Under the Johnson plan, voters elected a legislature and
elected "Conservative" Jonathan Worth as governor.1 56  Worth
defeated William W. Holden, Johnson's temporary appointee as
provisional governor.15 7 The legislature passed a Black Code for
former slaves. It rejected the proposed Fourteenth Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution.9  It did this in part, because it banned
state or federal office holding by "Confederates" who had taken
and violated (as the Congress saw it) the oath to support the
Constitution-disqualifying them until Congress lifted the ban,16
which it did in 1872;61 in part, because it would proportionally
reduce the representation in the Federal House and Electoral
College of Southern states (or any state) that disfranchised any
males twenty-one years of age or older (including newly-freed
slaves) except for rebellion or other crime;1 2 in part, because it
banned payment of the state's war debt;6 and, no doubt, in part,
because of its broad equality and equal liberty provisions. 4
Congress responded with the Military Reconstruction Act of
March 2, 1867,1 and with subsequent Reconstruction Acts.6  The
Acts divided Southern states into military districts and required,
before readmission to the Union, a constitutional convention
elected by manhood suffrage that would abolish slavery and
enfranchise the free Blacks and newly-free slaves.6
C. North Carolina Tries Democracy
Now under a mandate from Congress, North Carolina called
a constitutional convention, with delegates elected under broad
155. Id.
156. LEFLER & NEWSOME, supra note 109, at 456.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 457.
159. Id. at 458.
160. Id.
161. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 3.
162. Id. at § 2.
163. Id. at § 4.
164. Id. at § 1 (protecting privileges or immunities, due process, and equal
protection of the laws); ESCOTT, supra note 102, at 101, 104-05.
165. An Act to Provide for the More Efficient Government of the Rebel States,
Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428 (1867).
166. Act of Mar. 23, 1867, ch. 6, 15 Stat. 2 (1867); Act of July 19, 1867, ch. 30, 15
Stat. 14 (1867).
167. LEFLER & NEWSOME, supra note 109, at 458-59.
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manhood suffrage that included Black males."' In the
constitutional convention, Republicans had a majority of 107 to
thirteen; fifteen Black delegates were elected.1
The constitution, approved by the newly expanded electorate,
expressed strong commitments to liberty and equality.170 Article I,
Section 1 declared that "all men are created equal; that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that
among these are life, liberty, the enjoyment of the fruits of their
own labor, and the pursuit of happiness." '171 Article I, Section 2
provided that "all political power is vested in, and derived from,
the people .... [G]overnment ... is instituted solely for the good
of the whole. 172
The constitution abolished property qualifications for
voting.173 It called for General Assembly electoral districts of equal
population, with the qualification that each county should have at
least one representative in the House of Representatives. 17 4  It
guaranteed manhood suffrage, even including former Confederate
leaders. It provided for elected local governments and elected
judges instead of appointment at the state level-a blow to the
former elite squirearchy."' It also called for a uniform system of
free public education (of which the University of North Carolina
was a part), generally banned imprisonment for debt, and
provided for a homestead exemption."'
In 1868, under the new constitution, Republicans won the
legislature, and William Holden won back the governor's office.178
The party's motto was "Free Speech, Free Labor, Free Ballot and
Free Schools.""17 According to historian Deborah Beckel, the party
had the highest percent of White members of any Southern
Republican Party; it attracted working-class men, agricultural
168. Id. at 460.
169. Id.
170. N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 1 (1868).
171. Id.
172. Id. at § 2.
173. Id.
174. Id.; see also ESCOTT, supra note 102, at 144; LEFLER & NEWSOME, supra
note 109, at 460-61.
175. N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. II, § 5 (1868); see also ESCOTT, supra note 102, at
142; LEFLER & NEWSOME, supra note 109, at 460-61.
176. ESCOTT, supra note 102, at 142-44; LEFLER & NEWSOME, supra note 109, at
460-61.
177. BECKEL, supra note 116, at 61-63; LEFLER & NEWSOME, supra note 109, at
460.
178. LEFLER & NEWSOME, supra note 109, at 456.
179. BECKEL, supra note 116, at 3.
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laborers and small farmers, and men who felt the pre-war political
system had denied them power."'
The new Republican legislature substantially increased
expenditures for education, though schools were racially
segregated.181 It provided for local elections. Non-elite men were
elected to local offices.1 2
Sweeping change[s] took place at the county level ... as new
types of men came into office instead of the wealthy notables
who had dominated the county courts .... [A] political
revolution had truly begun. Thousands of ordinary White
North Carolinians were voting Republican, and the
cooperation of these Whites with Black voters was having
potent effects.18
In the mountains, Republicans were typically White.1 4 In the
east, largely Black.15 But, "in [much of] the piedmont White and
Black voters together were producing a viable, competitive,
victorious Republican party.""18 Across the state, and particularly
in some Piedmont and eastern counties, including Wake County,
Black and White Republicans joined forces to create and develop
"grassroots political organizations, committees, conventions and
canvassing." ' 7
More than the prior post-war Conservative government, the
new men in local government, "showed determination to act for
the good of the people, not the elite."1 8 So, for example, historian
Paul Escott reports that in Randolph County, the new
commissioners set out "to revive and improve the public schools."1 9
After careful and extensive investigation, the commissioners:
resolved that 'the number of school houses to be supplied'
should be increased to eighty and that each schoolhouse
should accommodate at least thirty pupils .... Their plans
included [B]lack children as well as [W]hite children, and they
apportioned school funds strictly 'in proportion to the number
of children in each township.'1 0
In response to Republican electoral success in 1868, an
180. Id.
181. Id. at 67-68.
182. ESCOTT, supra note 102, at 144-45.
183. Id. at 144-45.
184. Id. at 145.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. BECKEL, supra note 116, at 8.
188. ESCOTT, supra note 102, at 145.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 145-46.
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angry and beleaguered elite determined to regain its [political]
privileges by attacking racial equality as the weakest point in
the Republican platform of social reform.' 9' Instead of letting
Republicans define the issue as democracy-universal
manhood suffrage, local democracy, free public schools for all,
and expanded economic opportunities- [anti-coalition]
Conservatives set out to make [W]hite supremacy the central
question. 92
The depression of the 1870s was a factor that contributed to the
waning influence of Southern Republicans, dealing an additional
blow to the credibility of surviving Republican governments in the
South.9
The anti-coalition "Conservatives" (who, by the 1870s, began
to call themselves Democrats) used race as a tool to disrupt a
Black-White (and majority Black) political coalition. T9
Republicans, perhaps 30% of whose voters were White,1  were
vilified as race traitors.9 Later, when Populists defected from the
anti-coalition Democratic Party and allied with Republicans, they
were denounced as "White negroes."19 7
To counter Republican appeals to less affluent Whites,
"Conservatives" said all Whites shared an interest in the
debasement of the Negro. Racism was a "tool to split" a
democratic revolution.199  (Of course, democracy was radically
incomplete, since women were denied the right to vote and serve
on juries, and Blacks who left slavery with no economic assets to
speak of were disadvantaged by these prior determinations.)
The effort to restore the former economic and political elite
was not at all limited to denunciation, ostracism, and economic
pressure, as painful as that no doubt was."' Between 1868 and
1872, as Paul Escott explains,
[T]he Klan's reign of terror accounted for at least one to two
hundred whippings in Rutherford County alone, and far more
across piedmont counties such as Alamance, Caswell, Lincoln,
Gaston, Cleveland, Mecklenburg, Guilford, Orange, Randolph,
Chatham, Montgomery, and Moore. Innumerable
191. Id. at 148.
192. Id.
193. FONER, supra note 116, at 585; see id. at 535-63 (explaining multiple
factors contributing to the waning of Southern Republicans).
194. Id.
195. BECKEL, supra note 116, at 3.
196. ESCOTT, supra note 102, at 148.
197. PERMAN, supra note 1, at 157.
198. ESCOTT, supra note 102, at 148.
199. Id. at 149.
200. Id. at 152.
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schoolhouses were burned and scores of Black and White
Republicans were murdered .... In Alamance the Klan hung
Wyatt Outlaw, the county's foremost Black Republican, from a
tree only thirty yards from the door of the courthouse in
Graham. In Caswell County during the local Democratic
convention, a Klan deception lured [White state] Senator John
W. Stephens into a backroom of the courthouse where one
man choked him with a rope while another stabbed him
fatally in the throat .... The old, formerly established elite
organized the Klan and directed its violence to accomplish one
central purpose: to reestablish the hierarchy and control to
which they were accustomed. The immediate and primary
goal of the Klan was to wrest political power away from
201Republicans.
Rape was another Klan weapon.0 2 Remarkably, Republicans,
White and Black, continued to vote in substantial numbers.2 3
Racial prejudice was not limited to Democrats, and there
were interracial strains in the Republican coalition. Occasional
corruption and opportunism were not limited to one political
faction. The Republican legislature had made an unwise
investment in railroad bonds and there was some (bipartisan
actually) corruption in connection with railroad bonds in Southern
states.2 5  Faced with Klan violence, murder, race-baiting, and
whipping of the Klan's political opponents, Governor Holden
declared martial law in certain counties and suspended the writ of
habeas corpus .2  The effort was a failure in the end and produced
a backlash.2 7 The anti-coalition "Conservatives," now increasingly
called Democrats, won the election of 1870, impeached Holden 208
and after 1877 controlled state offices until, in 1891, a farmer's
revolt produced a reformist "farmer's legislature. 0 9
The story of the use of violence against a struggling broad
democracy is a sad, depressing chapter in North Carolina history.
But violence, vilification, and intimidation were not the only
methods aimed at the Black-White political coalition. When in
201. Id. at 154. For a discussion of the Klan's political terrorism and the role of
elite Conservative Party leaders, see BECKEL, supra note 116, at 69-73.
202. BECKEL, supra note 116, at 70-71.
203. ESCOTT, supra note 102, at 158.
204. See FONER, supra note 116, at 538-39.
205. LEFLER & NEWSOME, supra note 109, at 493-94. For a discussion of
railroad bonds in various Southern states, see FONER, supra note 116, at 386-90
(discussing railroad corruption).
206. ESCOTT, supra note 102, at 162.
207. Id. at 185.
208. LEFLER & NEWSOME, supra note 109, at 469.
209. Id. at 513.
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power, anti-coalition Democrats, known early on as
"Conservatives," used electoral devices to limit democracy as well
as to disadvantage their opponents and to disrupt the Republican
multi-racial political coalition. Though often not specifically race-
based, many devices were crafted to disproportionately
disadvantage Blacks and therefore the Republicans.
D. Redemption: A Triumph of the Anti-Coalition
"Conservatives" Who Became "Democrats"
With anti-coalition Democrat Zebulon Vance's inauguration
as governor in 1877, North Carolina experienced "Redemption.""21
The "Redeemer" legislature passed the Local Government Act of
1877.211 It essentially abolished elected county government and
returned to local officials appointed at the state level."' "In order
to ensure that White [anti-coalition] Democrats would dominate
the Black majority districts of eastern North Carolina, the law
empowered the legislature to appoint justices of the peace who, in
turn, would choose county commissioners.""1 3 Abolition of local
government denied Republicans local offices even in areas in the
West where White Republicans were in the majority. 4 As long as
anti-coalition Democrats were in power at the state level, local
officials would be Democrats. The County Commissioners could
also exempt anyone from the poll tax for any reason.215 The 1877
"Redeemer" legislature also gerrymandered legislative districts so
as to minimize Republican power.1
In 1875, the anti-coalition party obtained some significant
changes proposed by a closely-divided new constitutional
convention. 7  "Conservatives" (soon to be called Democrats)
banned integrated education and interracial marriage; reduced
the number of judges, eliminating a number of Republicans;
provided for state-wide election of judges (also disadvantaging
Republicans); and obtained a constitutional amendment allowing
210. WILLIAM A. LINK, NORTH CAROLINA: CHANGE AND TRADITION IN A
SOUTHERN STATE 236 (2009).
211. Id.
212. An Act to Establish County Governments, 1876-1877 N.C. Sess. Laws 226,
ch. 141.
213. LINK, supra note 210, at 236; An Act to Establish County Governments,
1876-1877 N.C. Sess. Laws 226, at ch. 141, §§ 4-5.
214. LINK, supra note 210, at 236.
215. An Act to Reveal Chapter Thirty-Nine of Battle's Reversal, 1876-1877 N.C.
Sess. Laws 266, ch. 155, § 21.
216. LINK, supra note 210, at 236.
217. Id. at 235.
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the General Assembly to end democratically elected local
government.218
Anti-coalition "Redeemers" repudiated a scandal-ridden debt
for railroad bonds, unwisely incurred by the Republican 1868-
1870 legislature. 21 "[Tihey drastically cut property taxes" so that
by 1890 only one other state in the union had lower property tax
rates.22 ' According to historian William Link, "[almong [the
Redeemers'] targets were the public schools, symbols of
Republican Reconstruction. Redeemers undermined the system of
public financing by drastic reductions that eliminated any
centralized state supervision over schools and returned complete
control to localities. 2  So school boards came under control of
county commissioners appointed by Democratic Justices of the
Peace who were appointed by the Democratic legislature.2
In 1889, the legislature passed a bill to require voters to
provide registrars with biographical facts such as dates and places
of birth.22 3  The information was not available to many men,
including poor Whites and many Blacks, including even some
Black leaders. 2 '4  The Act also gave considerable discretion to
registrars, appointed by the anti-coalition Democrats. Many
discouraged Blacks left the state. 2 1 Still, the anti-coalition
Democrats continued to face threats from various independent
movements, as well as from Republicans. Independents
supported:
'[A] free vote and a fair count,' a slogan they applied to [B]lack
as well as[W]hite ballots. The anti-Redeemers also pledged
full support for public education, a necessity if the Southern
poor, including the [B]lacks, were to rise. Moreover, nearly
every Independent [as well as Republicans] appealed openly
for Negro votes, thereby legitimizing the race's participation in
politics, sanctioning biracial political alliances, and
accustoming many White leaders to politicking in the [B]lack
218. Id. The Republicans obtained some provisions including bans on secret
societies and a ban on carrying concealed weapons. Id.
219. Id. at 241.
220. LINK, supra note 210, at 236.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 237.
223. An Act to Amend Chapter Sixteen of the Code in Relation to Elections, 1889
N.C. Sess. Laws 289, ch. 287, § 3.
224. BECKEL, supra note 116, at 150.
225. See 1889 N.C. Sess. Laws 289, ch. 287, § 6 (explaining that, as proof, the
Registrar may accept "such testimony, under oath, as may be satisfactory to the
registrar") (emphasis added).




E. A Populist Revolt and a Republican-Populist Coalition
The 1891 "farmer's legislature," departing to a degree from
conservative Democratic dogma, increased the tax rate for public
schools; established a normal college for White girls and an
agricultural and normal college for Blacks; increased state
appropriations to the University of North Carolina; regulated
railroads; and created a state railroad commission empowered to
reduce rates and eliminated special tax exemptions enjoyed by
railroads.228  But the legislature was far from uniformly
progressive: it passed laws to restrict Black emigration, failed to
pass an income tax, and defeated a bill providing free textbooks for
schoolchildren. 9
Later in 1894, a Republican-Populist fusion further
threatened the mastery of the conservative-anti-coalition
Democratic Party and its elite.2 11 The Republican-Populist
coalition captured the legislature in 1894 winning forty
Republican seats in the state House together with twenty-two
Populist seats.231  Democrats held only thirty-seven seats.2 2 By
1896, the Republicans and Populists held both U.S. Senate seats, a
majority of the congressional seats, and the governorship. The
Republican-Populist legislature repealed the Conservative Local
Government Act of 1877, restoring democratically elected local
government.2 4  Local elections were again abolished after the
Democratic victory in 1898.35 Once in power, the Republican-
Populist coalition revised election laws to protect the right to vote
and to support fairer elections. Under the new law, local election
boards should represent all parties, ballots could have party
symbols (to assist illiterates), and arbitrary powers of registrars to
disqualify voters and votes were limited.27 As a result, counties
227. J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE
RESTRICTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, 1880-1910 at
25-26 (1974) (emphasis added).
228. LEFLER & NEWSOME, supra note 109, at 546-47.
229. BECKEL, supra note 116, at 162-63.
230. Id. at 152-54.
231. Id. at 176.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 188.
234. LINK, supra note 210, at 266.
235. ESCOTT, supra note 102, at 259.
236. Id. at 251-52.
237. LINK, supra note 210, at 266.
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with a large African American electorate increased their vote total
from 18,543 in 1892 to 33,900 in 1896.238
F. A Renewed Assault on Democracy: Redemption Redux
In the election of 1898, the anti-coalition Democratic Party
again resorted to extreme racist appeals, political violence, Red
Shirt rifle bands, intimidation, and ballot box stuffing. 9
Democratic propaganda and speakers "admonished [men] to rise
up and act like White men, whose self-respect compelled them to
throw off 'Negro rule.' 240 In spite of claims of Negro domination
and Black rule, between 1895 and 1899 only eleven Americans of
African descent served in the North Carolina General Assembly. 
21
The number of Black office holders at the county level was also
limited.2 2 After their earlier defeat, Democratic newspaper editors
published articles suggesting that the state, as a result of fusion
rule, was suffering from a Black crime wave and widespread
sexual assaults by Black men on White women. 2" Democrats
encouraged women to entreat their men to "protect" them.4
Clergy, with their own private religious colleges, were
agitated by state funding for the public universities.245 Democratic
Chairman Furnifold Simmons secretly promised them strict limits
on funding of public colleges.4 Corporations in the state, in
return for a secret pledge not to raise their taxes, "provided most
of the plentiful funds to finance the [Democratic and intensely
racist] propaganda, picnics, and rallies., 24 7 The White Government
Union, "sought to register and propagandize Democratic voters"
and to intimidate opponents. 8
"More threatening still were the paramilitary Red
Shirts ... [whose] sole purpose was to intimidate opposition
voters, and especially Blacks. 2 9 It worked. "[T]he fusionists were
238. Id.
239. PERMAN, supra note 1, at 156-61.
240. Id. at 160.
241. LINK, supra note 210, at 269.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. PERMAN, supra note 1, at 160.
245. Id.
246. Id.





bewildered and fearful and, toward the end, virtually
immobilized." 25 Anti-coalition Democrats won a massive victory.
5 1
Political violence and intimidation and Democratic success
was capped by a vicious race riot and coup in Wilmington, North
Carolina. 5 ' The leaders of the coup dislodged the democratically-
elected government, burned the building that housed the Black
newspaper, and exiled remaining White and Black Republican
leaders from the city.
253
The Republican and Populist electoral reforms of 1894 and
following had aimed at a fair vote and a fair count, and at
facilitating rather than obstructing voting.254 The fusion election
reform laws were promptly repealed by Democrats in the 1899
session of the legislature. To prepare for a vote on a new
capstone disfranchising amendment to the state constitution, the
overwhelmingly Democratic North Carolina legislature modified
the election law.
Under the revised law, the legislature was to appoint a
seven-member state election board which would appoint county
election boards.2 57 No provision was made for the representation of
other political parties.2 5 ' An entirely new registration was
required for all voters.2 59 The registrars were to record the race of
the voter,26 ' and voters were required to provide to the registrar
their age, place of residence, owner of the residence or of the land
on which he lived, his occupation, place of business, employer if
any, whether he is listed for the poll tax, and any other questions
the registrar considered material.2 6 1 "Black men born into slavery
were often ignorant of their exact ages; streets in Negro areas
often had no names, houses had no numbers. 6 Democrats
employed this law to deny the vote to White and Black
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. H. LEON PRATHER, SR., DEMOCRACY BETRAYED: THE WILMINGTON RACE
RIOT OF 1898 AND ITs LEGACY (David S. Cecelski & Timothy B. Tyson eds., 1998)
(describing the race riot and coup that dislodged the elected government of
Wilmington, N.C.).
253. Id.
254. 1895 N.C. Sess. Laws 211, ch. 159.
255. 1899 N.C. Sess. Laws 106, ch. 16, § 1.
256. An Act to Regulate Elections, 1899 N.C. Sess. Laws 658, ch. 507.
257. Id. at ch. 507, § 4.
258. Id.
259. An Act to Regulate Elections, 1899 N.C. Sess. Laws 661, ch. 507, § 11.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. KOUSSER, supra note 227, at 48.
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Republicans and Populists. 23  Blacks, of course, were
presumptively Republicans. Registrars, now all anti-coalition
Democrats, were "granted virtually unlimited discretionary
power.2 4 Ballots were to be uniform, not distinguishable by color
or party emblem-a provision aimed at illiterate voters, mostly
Blacks, who could expect little help from election officials. To
further confuse voters, six different ballot boxes were provided,
one for each category of contested office.2 6  A vote placed in the
wrong box was not counted.2 7 The legislature expanded the right
to challenge voters.2 ' Any applicant for registration who admitted
not having listed his poll tax as required by law was to be referred
to the solicitor (district attorney) of the district who was to send an
indictment to the grand jury.29 The legislature also moved state
elections from November to August to insulate them from federal
supervision. Voting locations in precincts could be moved with
twenty days' notice. 1
With the electorate suitably culled, intimidated, selectively
challenged, and confused, the way was open for a vote on a
disfranchising amendment to the state constitution. It provided:
Every person presenting himself for registration shall be able
to read and write any section of the Constitution in the
English language: and before he shall be entitled to vote, he
shall have paid on or before the first day of March of the year
in which he proposes to vote his poll tax ... as prescribed by
law for the previous year.
A grandfather clause allowed voters who were qualified to vote in
North Carolina or in any other state in 1867 and their
descendants to escape the literacy qualifications provided they
registered before 1908.274
263. Id. at 50.
264. PERMAN, supra note 1, at 167; see also An Act to Regulate Elections, 1899
N.C. Sess. Laws 661-62, ch. 507, § 11.
265. An Act to Regulate Elections, 1899 N.C. Sess. Laws 668, ch. 507, § 27;
PERMAN, supra note 1, at 168.
266. PERMAN, supra note 1, at 168.
267. KOUSSER, supra note 227, at 50.
268. An Act to Regulate Elections, 1899 N.C. Sess. Laws 668, ch. 507, § 11.
269. Id.
270. PERMAN, supra note 1, at 168.
271. An Act to Regulate Elections, 1899 N.C. Sess. Laws 660, ch. 507, § 10.
272. PERMAN, supra note 1, at 171.
273. N.C. CONST. art. VI, § 4, amended by 1899 N.C. Sess. Laws. 341-42.
274. Id.; cf Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (finding a similar
Oklahoma grandfather clause racially discriminatory).
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Amazingly, in spite of all the attacks on White and Black
Republicans and on Populists and on fair elections, opponents of
the Amendment still polled at least 128,285 (counted) votes
against the amendment to 182,217 (counted) in favor. Curiously,
in the heavily Black second congressional district, Charles B.
Aycock, the anti-coalition Democratic candidate for governor,
carried the district by 18,333 votes and in three of the district's
counties the number of votes for Aycock exceeded the number of
Whites of voting age.276 In New Hanover County, which contained
the 51% Black city of Wilmington, only two votes were cast against
the amendment and only five for the Republican candidate for
governor.2 Force and fraud helped to carry the day for the anti-
coalition party. 8
Disfranchisement and the prior election "reforms" were a
response to a salient political fact: "robust, interracial political
coalitions" had flourished and enjoyed some success in North
Carolina. "[T]he very success of interracial political
coalitions ... catalyzed the disfranchisement movement among
the previously ruling [W]hite [conservative] elite. '86 Whites were
deeply divided over disfranchisement and without the elimination
of so many Black voters by intimidation, election "reforms" and the
rest, disfranchisement might well have failed. 1
In addition to the literacy test, the White Democratic primary
was instituted, as one editor explained, "to keep the White men
united., 212 It was another device to protect against White-Black
coalitions and alliances. Still another device to disrupt White-
Black alliances and coalitions was segregation, for example, on
railroads and steamboats.2 4  The effect was to make Blacks a
pariah class and to discourage White-Black association, and, of
course, political coalitions and alliances 8
Hugh Talmage Lefler and Albert Ray Newsome, in their
book, A History of a Southern State: North Carolina, describe the
275. PERMAN, supra note 1, at 171.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 170-71.
279. Pildes, supra note 117, at 314.
280. Id.
281. See id.
282. KOUSSER, supra note 227, at 75-76.
283. Id.
284. An Act to Promote the Comfort of Travelers on Railroad Trains, and for
Other Purposes, 1899 N.C. Sess. Laws 539, ch. 384.
285. PERMAN, supra note 1, at 171-72.
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former "Conservative" Party-renamed as the Democratic Party-
and its principles up to around 1900.2' This anti-coalition
Democratic Party "did not commit the state to a progressive
program of public education, internal improvements, and state
development" that the state had followed up to 1861.287 Instead, it
leased and sold the state's private capital-the state railroad and
track.2 11 "Party leaders and public officials held railroad stock,
rode on free passes, served as railroad lobbyists and attorneys,
and aided the railroads in securing special legislative favors of tax
exemption and immunity from public regulation. 2 1 While
companies expanded and provided for the transportation needs of
the state, they charged higher rates than were charged in other
sections, inflated their capitalization and granted passes and
rebates to influential friends and large customers.2 °  "The
conservatively controlled Democratic party became the ally and
guardian of the railroad and industrial interests .... It
championed the laissez-faire philosophy ... and the freedom of
business from government interference. 9 1 The party opposed a
rising demand for a regulatory railroad commission, for
readjustment of discriminatory taxation, for social legislation to
correct the evil effect of long hours and low wages upon mill
workers, and for the expansion of the system of public education.
29 2
"It opposed all such measures of economic and social reform
allegedly because they would necessitate higher taxes, would
discourage business and perhaps drive it from the state, and
would cause discussion which might split the Democratic party
and permit the return of Republican-Negro control.2 9 3
Of course, the anti-coalition party evolved over time, as a new
generation of leaders replaced its former leaders.2 9 4  The new
generation, including Governor Aycock, emphasized expanded
public education (separate, but not equal) and pursued some other
progressive causes such as public health.9  What did not change
286. See LEFLER & NEWSOME, supra note 109.







294. LINK, supra note 210, at 268.




for most was the commitment to the racial caste system and to
disfranchisement to destroy the interracial coalition.9
G. The Congress and the Courts Face the Terrorist Attack
on Democracy and Disfranchisement in the Late 19 h and
Early 201h Centuries
Haltingly, Congress responded to Klan and similar
politically-inspired terror by passing laws that targeted the Klan's
and other groups' politically-inspired violence."7  The Klan
targeted Republicans, both White and Black, and people who had
either led or supported the Republican Party.9 In response, these
Congressional laws reached "private" political terrorists acting
with the intent to either deprive Americans of their rights,
privileges and immunities as citizens of the United States, or of
equal privileges and immunities.9 The description was aimed at
Klan-like activities and it fit-or seemed to at least. Other laws
attempted to protect the right to vote.00  Section 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment provides for the proportional reduction of
representation in the federal House and Electoral College of any
state that denies or abridges the right to vote of any male citizens
over twenty-one years of age in state or federal elections for the
legislature, executive, or judiciary for any reasons other than
rebellion or other crime."' It should have greatly reduced
Southern representation in the House of Representatives and in
the Electoral College after disfranchisement. But, it did not.
The short story is that in the late 19 h and much of the 20 h
Centuries, the judiciary at first failed to protect Bill of Rights
liberties except against the federal government, typically denied
federal power to reach pervasive private terror that undermined
democratic rights including speech and association, 3 and too often
296. Id. at 286.
297. Id. at 233.
298. Id. at 230.
299. Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140; see also Act of February 28, 1871,
16 Stat. 433; Act of April 20, 1871, 17 Stat. 13.
300. U.S. CONST. amend. XV; Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140; see also
Act of February 28, 1871, 16 Stat. 433; Act of April 20, 1871, 17 Stat. 13.
301. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
302. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875) (rejecting the idea that Bill
of Rights liberties were general rights of American citizens, and instead finding
such rights as merely a limit on federal power).
303. Id. (applying a state action syllogism-the Fourteenth Amendment limits
only state power. Klansmen (and similar groups of political terrorists) do not wield
state power; therefore, Klan power used against democratic rights is unreachable
by Congress.); see also James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127 (1903).
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hobbled federal laws designed to protect the right to vote.3 4 Both
the courts and Congress (with Southern representation
unconstitutionally swelled by counting now disfranchised Blacks
for purposes of representation) failed to enforce the penalty for
disfranchisement in Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
0 5
The Court failed to recognize any judicial power to deal with
pervasive state disfranchisement based on race,"' and it treated
facially neutral laws designed to disfranchise Black and poor
voters as permissible. 7  Because they believed that facially
neutral and generally applicable laws designed to get rid of Black
voters were constitutional, a view ratified by the Court, the
disfranchising Southern elite was quite candid about what it was
up to."' Today, the Court holds that an intent to discriminate
against African American voters, even by facially-neutral and
generally applicable laws, is deeply problematic-at least if an
304. United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876) (construing narrowly a federal
statutory protection of the right to vote since race was not reiterated in subsequent
sections of the statute). For a refreshing exception, see Ex parte Yarbrough, 110
U.S. 651 (1884) (finding that there is a federal power to protect against private
violence in federal elections).
305. See, e.g., SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 20, at 65 (discussing
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment); cf. id. at 71-72 (discussing failures in
Congress though not specifically dealing with Section 2). For scholarly discussions
of Section 2, see, for example, Eugene Sidney Bayer, The Apportionment Section of
the Fourteenth Amendment: A Neglected Weapon for Defense of the Voting Rights of
Southern Negroes, 16 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 965, 965-76 (1965) (describing Section
2); Arthur Earl Bonfield, The Right to Vote and Judicial Enforcement of Section
Two of the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 108, 121-36 (1960) (detailing
a "workable plan" for judicial enforcement of Section 2); George David Zuckerman,
A Consideration of the History and Present Status of Section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 30 FORDHAM L. REV. 93, 94-107 (1961) (discussing the intent of the
framers of Section 2 and their expectation as to its operation).
306. Giles v. Teasley, 193 U.S. 146, 161 (1904) (stating that no damage remedy
was available-a wrong without a remedy); Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 486
(1903) (holding that courts lack equitable power to enjoin intentional
disfranchisement of Black voters in Alabama). For a splendid discussion of Giles'
cases and their central place in understanding the nation and the Court's response
to the oligarchic-anti-democratic coup that occurred when the South was
"redeemed," see Pildes, supra note 117, at 297 (arguing that Giles' cases should
occupy a central place in the constitutional law canon and noting their absence
from the major constitutional law books at the time).
307. See, e.g., Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213, 222 (1898) (announcing that
nothing tangible can be deduced from the statement of the Mississippi Supreme
Court that "[r]estrained by the federal constitution from discriminating against the
negro race, the [disfranchising Mississippi constitutional] convention
discriminat[ed] against its characteristics"); Ratliffv. Beale, 20 So. 865, 868 (Miss.
1896).
308. See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 112 (quoting Carter Glass in the Virginia
Constitutional Convention extolling "elimination of every negro voter who can be
gotten rid of, legally..."); see also id. at 111-16 (discussing disfranchisement).
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intent to discriminate based on race is clear.9 This fact has a
chilling effect on announcing an intent to use facially-neutral
devices to disfranchise Blacks.
Effective responses to Southern disfranchisement came later,
in the 1940s and with the Voting Rights Act of 1965.310 Of course,
as success in the Democratic primary became tantamount to
election, there were divisions in the North Carolina Democratic
Party between more populist and more liberal Democrats and
Conservative Democrats. 11
Part IV. Mid-20h Century Transformations
A. The Racial Caste System Under Siege
A major breach in Southern disfranchisement came when the
Court, in 1944, held that a White-only Democratic primary
violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 In December 1946, by
executive order, President Harry Truman established a Civil
Rights Commission.1 In July 1948, also by executive order,
President Truman integrated the military.3 4 When, in 1948, the
Democratic Convention endorsed a strong civil rights plank in its
platform, a number of Southern delegates walked out in protest.
15
Subsequently, in the 1948 Presidential election, four deep-South
states defected from the Democratic Party and voted for the
States' Rights segregationist candidate, Strom Thurmond."' In
1954, the Court decided school segregation violated equal
protection, though there was little practical integration of
Southern schools for some years. 7 In 1964, the nation struck
309. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 223-34 (1985) (holding Alabama's
disfranchisement for crimes selected on the view that Blacks were more likely to
commit them was unconstitutional where the predominant motive was race).
310. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. 1973.
311. See WARREN ASHBY, FRANK PORTER GRAHAM, A SOUTHERN LIBERAL 309-10
(1980).
312. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944), overruling Grovey v. Townsend,
295 U.S. 45 (1935).
313. Exec. Order No. 9808, 3 C.F.R. § 184 (1946).
314. Exec. Order No. 9981, 3 C.F.R. § 722 (1943-1948).
315. Alonzo L. Hamby, 1948 Democratic Convention: The South Secedes Again,
SMITHSONIAN MAG.COM (Aug. 2008), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history-
archaeology/1948-democratic-convention.html.
316. Compare Election of 1944, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.
presidency.ucsb.edu/showelection.php?year1944#axzz2jLQoRCGO (last visited
Oct. 31, 2013), with Election of 1948, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.
presidency.ucsb.edu/showelection.php?year1948#axzz2jLQoRCGO (last visited
Oct. 31, 2013).
317. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). On the slow pace of school
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another blow at the racial caste system.318 Under the leadership of
President Lyndon Johnson and responding to civil rights leaders
including Martin Luther King, Jr. and many individuals
demonstrating for equal rights, Congress passed the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, banning discrimination in places of public
accommodation and in employment.319 Southern Democrats, with
a few exceptions, and all the few Southern Republicans, opposed
the Act. Still, the Act had bipartisan support as did the 1965
Voting Rights Act.
B. Political Transformations: A Southern Strategy
But a seismic political shift was underway. Senator Barry
Goldwater, the Republican presidential nominee, opposed the 1964
Act on states' rights grounds, 21 following advice from his legal
advisors William Rehnquist and Robert Bork. Still, the 1965
Voting Rights Act and related developments eliminated most
roadblocks to Black registration and the number of African
American voters in the Southern states soared.3
Goldwater's limited success in the South after his opposition
to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the broad popularity of George
Wallace's new, more muted and coded racial appeal, 4 promised a
new political alignment. 25  When he signed the 1964 Act,
President Lyndon Johnson reportedly told his young aide Bill
Moyers that he had delivered the South to the Republican Party
integration in the South following Brown, see Michael Kent Curtis et al., School
Desegration After Brown v. Board of Education, in 2 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN
CONTEXT 1739-44 (3d. ed. 2010).
318. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
319. Id.
320. Brad McMillan, Effective Bipartisan Leadership, PEORIA MAGAZINES.COM
(Nov. 2011), http://www.peoriamagazines.com/ibi/2011/nov/effective-bipartisan-
leadership.
321. David Farber, Barry Goldwater on the Civil Rights Act: The Antecedent to
Rand Paul, HISTORY NEWS NETWORK, http://www.hnn.us/article/126630 (last
visited Oct. 31, 2013).
322. TAYLOR BRANCH, PILLAR OF FIRE: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1963-65 at
356-57 (1998); JAMES M. PERRY, BARRY GOLDWATER: A NEW LOOK AT A
PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE 125 (1964).
323. KEYSSAR, supra note 308, at 264.
324. See JOHN E. ROEMER ET AL., RACISM, XENOPHOBIA AND DISTRIBUTION:
MULTI-ISSUE POLITICS IN ADVANCED DEMOCRACIES 59 (2007) (stating that "[the]
success of George Wallace's racial appeals in the 1968 campaign highlighted that
[White] back-lash had moved North" as Northerners began realize that they could
relate to Wallace's rhetoric).
325. Id. at 59-60.
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for his generation and for Moyers' generation.326 In the 1964
Johnson landslide, a few more Southern states defected to the
Republican Party, but by 1968, the defection became a rout.
George Wallace and Richard Nixon divided all the Southern states
except Texas.327  Richard Nixon became president, William
Rehnquist joined the Justice Department, vetting Supreme Court
nominees (and soon was appointed to the Court), and Robert Bork
became Nixon's Solicitor General, then a federal judge, and finally
(a decade later) an unsuccessful Reagan nominee to the Court. 8
Both Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan pursued a Southern
strategy. Then-Republican strategist Kevin Phillips suggested
that Nixon's election and the possible full capture of the South
could produce a new national Republican majority.3 Emphasizing
coded racial issues could help convert alienated Southern
Democrats to Republicans and cement a long-term Republican
political alignment.3 1 According to Warren Weaver, writing in the
New York Times:
Full racial polarization is an essential ingredient of Phillip's
[sic] political pragmatism. He wants to see a [B]lack
Democratic Party, particularly in the South, because this will
drive into the Republican Party precisely the kind of anti-
Negro [W]hites who will help constitute the emerging
majority. This even leads him to support some civil rights
efforts.
332
Starting with Goldwater, the actions of Republican leaders
reflected a new emphasis on values somewhat different from those
of Lincoln's party.3 Ronald Reagan, for example, opened his 1980
326. BRANCH, supra note 322, at 404-05; WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE
WHITE HOUSE LOOKS SOUTH: FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, HARRY S. TRUMAN, LYNDON
B. JOHNSON 325 (2005).
327. Election of 1968, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu
/showelection.php?year=1968#axzz2jXDFFc6i (last visited Nov. 2, 2013).
328. On the Rehnquist nomination, see JOHN DEAN, THE REHNQUIST CHOICE:
THE UNTOLD STORY OF NIXON (2001). See also 37, Richard M. Nixon,
WHITEHOUSE.GOv, http://www.Whitehouse.gov/about/presidents/richardnixon (last
visited Nov. 2, 2013); Bill Mears, Robert Bork, Known for Contentious Supreme
Court Nomination, Dies at 85, CNN POLITICS (Dec. 20, 2012), http://www.cnn.com
/2012/12/19/politics/robert-bork-dead/; William Rehnquist: Biography,
BIOGRAPHY.COM, http://www.biography.com/people/william-rehnquist-9454479 (last
visited Nov. 2, 2013).
329. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 43-44 (2012); KEVIN PHILLIPS, THE EMERGING
REPUBLICAN MAJORITY 223-24, 259-60 (1969).
330. PHILLIPS, supra note 329, at 187, 260.
331. ALEXANDER, supra note 329, at 44-45.
332. Warren Weaver, The Emerging Republican Majority, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21,
1969, at BR3.
333. PHILLIPS, supra note 329, at 74-76.
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presidential campaign in the Mississippi county-where young
Black civil rights workers had been killed-with an endorsement
of states' rights.334 In Georgia, he complimented Jefferson Davis
for his balanced budget amendment.3
Of course, multiple factors influenced the transformation of
Southern politics, and the Civil Rights Act, Voting Rights Act, and
the Southern Strategy akin to that suggested by Phillips and
Alexander, were only some of them.3 From 1972 to 2008 the
South was solidly Republican in presidential politics; by the 1990s
increasingly, and then heavily, Republican in congressional,
governor, and state legislative elections. 37 The North Carolina
gerrymander may promise political mastery for a long time,
whatever most voters do. In the 2008 election, Barack Obama was
elected president, and re-elected in 2012 with the help of a biracial
coalition. His election galvanized anti-coalition forces once
• 338
again.
Part V. Voting Rights and the Law
In the following examination of aspects of Voting Rights bear
in mind, first, that the Court has read the Voting Rights Act and
its 1982 Amendments to require an extraordinary majority-
minority-district quota-based remedy in cases in which White-
polarized voting-White unwillingness to vote for Black
candidates-frustrated the equal opportunity of African
Americans or other minorities to elect candidates of their choice. 9
334. Joseph Crespino, Ronald Reagan's South: The Tangled Roots of Modern
Southern Conservatism, in LIVING IN THE EIGHTIES 37 (Gil Troy & Vincent J.
Cannato, eds. 2009) (explaining how, in August of 1980, Reagan made his first
presidential campaign stop at the Neshoba County Fair, where, "Ulust 16 years
earlier, the discovery of three murdered civil rights workers in Neshoba County
had horrified the nation").
335. BERNARD VON BOTHMER, FRAMING THE SIXTIES: THE USE AND ABUSE OF A
DECADE FROM RONALD REAGAN To GEORGE W. BUSH 68 (2010) (quoting Roger
Wilkins as having stated that when Reagan was in Stone Mountain Georgia, he
said "that 'Jefferson Davis was one of my heroes').
336. See ALEXANDER, supra note 329, at 38, 43-44; PHILLIPS, supra note 329, at
205-06, 237-38.
337. See PHILLIPS, supra note 329, at 237-42.
338. See Steven Hahn, Political Racism in the Age of Obama, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
10, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/11/opinion/sunday/political-racism-in-
the-age-of-obama.html?_r=0; Ruy Teixeira & John Halpin, The Obama Coalition in
the 2012 Election and Beyond, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Dec. 4, 2012), http://www.
americanprogress.org/issues/progressive-movementlreportl2012/12/04/46664/the-
obama-coalition-in-the-2012-election-and-beyond/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2014).
339. See Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1 (2009); Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S.
146 (1993); Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
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Note that polarization is a slippery concept if the number of White
voters supporting a White Democrat and the number supporting a
Black Democrat is roughly equivalent. One thing to focus on is
whether the triggers or preconditions for the extraordinary
majority-minority district remedy are present. If the
preconditions are not present but racial quotas are used, a
constitutional question is squarely presented: is racial districting
by quotas without a compelling remedial justification simply a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal
protection? The answer should be "yes" because the remedial
justification for extreme racial classifications and quotas is absent.
A second question lurks in the background-when, if ever, are
racial electoral quotas justified?
A. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, the 1982
Amendments, and Majority-Minority Districts
The Voting Rights Act was a huge advance, greatly
increasing the ability of Americans of African descent to
participate in the political process.340 Still, at first, with a few
notable exceptions, Southern state legislative districts with a
White majority did not elect a Black legislator. 1  In the 1970s
through 1985, approximately 1% of all state legislative districts
that were less than 50% Black elected Black legislators."2 One
response was to amend the Voting Rights Act to provide that a
violation occurs if the political processes were not equally open to
the nomination and election of minority candidates.
Section 2 of the Act currently provides:
§ 10301. Denial or abridgement of right to vote on account of
race or color through voting qualifications or prerequisites;
establishment of violation
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or
standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by
any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in
a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the
United States to vote on account of race or color, or in
contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 10303(f)(2)
of this title, as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the
340. KEYSSAR, supra note 308, at 111-16, 264-65.
341. Richard H. Pildes, The Politics of Race: Quiet Revolution in the South, 108
HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1368 (1995) (reviewing QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH
(Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994)).
342. Bernard Grofman & Lisa Handley, The Impact of the Voting Rights Act on
Black Representation in Southern State Legislatures, 16 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 111, 113
(1991).
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totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political
processes leading to nomination or election in the State or
political subdivision are not equally open to participation by
members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in
that its members have less opportunity than other members of
the electorate to participate in the political process and to
elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which
members of a protected class have been elected to office in the
State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may
be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section
establishes a right to have members of a protected class
elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the
population.
The Supreme Court interpreted the 1982 amendment to the
Voting Rights Act to require the creation of majority-minority
districts where certain preconditions were met.344 In the 1986 case
of Thornburg v. Gingles, a case which struck down most
challenged multi-member districts, the Court explained that the
essence of a Section 2 claim was that "a certain electoral law,
practice, or structure interacts with social and historical
conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by
[Bilack and [W]hite voters to elect their preferred
representatives. 345  By the rule from Gingles, in a challenged
district, "a bloc voting majority must usually be able to defeat
candidates supported by a politically cohesive, geographically
insular minority group.3 46 In such cases, a new majority-minority
district was a remedy required by Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act. 347
The Court elaborated: "[tihe purpose of inquiring into the
existence of racially polarized voting is twofold: to ascertain
whether minority group members constitute a politically cohesive
unit and to determine whether [Wihites vote sufficiently as a bloc
usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidates.3 4' 8 The Court
continued:
[I]n general, a [W]hite bloc vote that normally will defeat the
combined strength of minority support plus [W]hite
"crossover" votes rises to the level of legally significant [W]hite
bloc voting. The amount of [W]hite bloc voting that can
343. 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2013) (formerly cited as 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (a)-(b) (2012)).
344. See Voinovich, 507 U.S. at 156 ("The federal courts may not order the
creation of majority-minority districts unless necessary to remedy a violation of
federal law.").
345. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986).
346. Id. at 49.
347. Id.
348. Id. at 56 (emphasis added).
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generally "minimize or cancel" [B]lack voters' ability to elect
representatives of their choice, however, will vary from district
149to district ....
Here the Court listed a number of factors including "the
percentage of the registered voters in the district who are
members of the minority group. 3 0
Logically, the larger the percentage of cohesive minority
voters in a district with less than a majority of Black (or other
minority) voters, the smaller percentage of crossover or coalition
voters will be required to help minority voters elect the candidate
of their choice in a White majority district 3 1 Crossover voters are
those in the majority supporting the minority candidate despite
the fact that most members of the majority race do not-for
example, White voters who vote for the Black candidate when the
majority of Whites in the district do not.
Based on this understanding, a district in which Blacks were
not a majority, but in which their preferred (often Black)
candidate could and would typically win the primary and general
election, would not be a district justifying judicial creation of a
majority-minority district. 2  If so, it would follow that the
legislature could not justify transforming the district into a
majority-minority one to avoid liability under Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act because there would be no liability to avoid.
In a groundbreaking article, Professor Richard H. Pildes
noted that in the 1990s, social scientists and the courts agreed
(based largely on information from the 1980s) that voting was
substantially and pervasively polarized on racial lines. 53  He
pointed that courts and social scientists agreed:
(2) [T]hat [B]lack-majority electorates were therefore required
to enable [B]lack voters to overcome racial bloc voting; (3) that
[B]lack political participation, even among eligible voters, was
lower than among [W]hite voters and... (4) as a result, that
where voting was in fact racially polarized [B]lack election
districts must have majority [B]lack populations, roughly
around 55%, to be "safe" havens for overcoming racial bloc1 54
voting.
349. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id.; see Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 156 (1993) ("Of course, the
federal courts may not order the creation of majority-minority districts unless
necessary to remedy a violation of federal law.").
353. Richard H. Pildes, Is Voting Rights Law Now At War With Itself?. Social
Science and Voting Rights in the 2000s, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1517 (2002).
354. Id. at 1527.
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Professor Pildes noted that "[tihese principles were reflected
nationwide ... in the redistricting of the 1990s. 35 5  That
redistricting created a number of majority-minority districts. 56
But as the nation developed after the 1980s, these
observations were no longer as generally accurate. 5 7  Black
political participation soared and White Democratic crossover
voting increased so that majority-minority districts were, as a
matter of empirical fact, less often required for African American
voters to have an equal chance to elect their preferred
candidates 8
When the Court promulgated the Gingles 9 test in 1986,
crossover White voting for Black candidates had usually been
small. Gingles itself had found sufficient crossover voting in a
Durham district so that a majority-minority district was not
required in that instance.6 By 2000, the political landscape had
changed dramatically in many places.6 1 In North Carolina, for
example, Black participation in voting often exceeded that of
Whites in the elections leading up to 2012.2 Crossover voting
increased.6
To be sure, studies were not entirely consistent. 4 Still,
generally, by the later 1990s, an estimated Black registered voter
population between 33% and 39% (and certainly between 40% and
49%) could often elect a Black candidate, and White voters would
crossover to support Black Democratic candidates at rates of
365
approximately 20%-36% . Because Black voters were strongly
Democratic, in Democratic districts candidates preferred by Blacks
had a very high chance of winning both the primary and general
election with significantly less than 50% Black voting age
population.6
355. Id. at 1528.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 1530-36.
358. Id. at 1536-38.
359. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
360. Id. at 80.
361. See THOM FILE, THE DIVERSIFYING ELECTORATE-VOTING RATES BY RACE
AND HISPANIC ORIGIN IN 2012 (AND OTHER RECENT ELECTIONS, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU) (2013), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/p20-568.pdf.
362. Id. at 9.
363. Id.
364. Cf generally Fredrick C. Harris et al., Macrodynamics of Black Political
Participation in the Post-Civil Rights Era, 67 J. POL. 1144, 1148 (2005).
365. Pildes, supra note 353, at 1531-32.
366. Id. at 1534.
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Since Blacks can often elect candidates of their choice with
less than 50% Black voting age population, it is understandable
that Blacks (whose political power would be diluted and whose
votes would be wasted by being packed into 50 or 50%+ Black
voting age population districts) might resist the creation of such
"steroid" districts. At any rate, as we have seen, every Black
legislator in the North Carolina General Assembly and the state
NAACP opposed the North Carolina legislature's 2011 racial
gerrymander.3 7 It is equally understandable that, in the search
for political mastery, Republicans champion such districts with
their corresponding wasting of Black votes and defeats of White
Democrats."'6 They have all the advantages of a gerrymander,
they increase racial polarization, and they serve to disrupt
multiracial coalitions6 9
Gerrymanders undermine our republican form of government
and make a mockery of the purpose behind one-person, one-vote.7
A system that allows a 51% majority or a 48% or smaller minority
to control a supermajority of the state legislature or of the
congressional delegation for the foreseeable future makes a
mockery of the principle of one-person, one-vote. 1 That mockery,
of course, is exactly what we have in many states. 2 A neutral and
pro-representative-democracy and anti-gerrymander golden rule is
right in principle, and in the long term may be useful to all. The
devices that benefit one side today may be turned against it in the
future-provided the judiciary is politically neutral between
parties. Racial gerrymanders are a more pernicious form of
367. See Pildes, supra note 353, and accompanying text.
368. See id.
369. See id.; FILE, supra note 361.
370. Cf. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (U.S. 1963) (arguing that the
conception of political equality in our founding documents is most accurately
distilled to the principle "one person, one vote"). In the one-person, one-vote cases,
the Court held districting schemes violated equal protection where they provided
that voters in some parts of the state-despite comprising only 25% of the state's
population-could elect a majority of the state legislature. Id. People in certain
geographical areas were severely disadvantaged. For example, a county with a
population of only 13,462 was given two seats in the Alabama House while another
county with a population of 314,301 was given only three. See generally Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (finding the apportionment of the Alabama legislature
violated the one-person, one-vote principle and therefore violated equal protection).
Gerrymandering is an analogous scheme, though the disadvantage is based on
political preference. For example, voters affiliated with one party who are in the
majority in that state are able to elect less than 33% of the state's congressmen and
congresswomen. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
371. See infra Appendix B.
372. See infra Appendix B.
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gerrymanders because they increase racial polarization and
disrupt biracial political cooperation.373
As a slim plurality of the Supreme Court sees it, there are
two types of gerrymanders.74 The standard political gerrymander
is an evil for which, at least so far, most justices see no judicial
remedy.7 5 Racial gerrymanders, however, may be susceptible to
judicial correction.7 For Justices in the current majority, the
problem is to distinguish racial gerrymanders from their
acceptable political counterparts.
For a racial gerrymander, the Court suggests that the
predominant motive must be racial,78 and proving that can be
difficult. 9 But, does the distinction make sense? Is it fine to use
race predominantly to disadvantage Black voters because they
vote Democratic just as it was once used because they voted
Republican? Here the legislature purportedly relies on Section 2
or 5 of the Voting Rights Act to create steroid majority-minority
districts even though candidates preferred by Blacks were winning
most of the time with little difficulty. And here the legislature set
quotas or "targets" to have Blacks in the legislature in proportion
to the state's Black voting age population, and it moved voters into
and out of these districts to make them 50%+ Black voting age
population, and drew districts with curious tentacles to pick up
additional Black voters. Strict scrutiny should apply to this gross
racial quota regime."' And this is so even if the purpose is to
373. See Jamie L. Carson et al., Redistricting and Party Polarization in the U.S.
House of Representatives, 35 AM. POL. RES. 878 (2007). But see Nolan McCarty et
al., Does Gerrymandering Cause Polarization?, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 666 (2009).
374. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
375. Id.
376. See id. at 348 (Souter, J., dissenting).
377. Compare Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (holding that deliberately
segregating voters into separate districts on the basis of race is a violation of
citizens' rights to participate in a "color-blind" electoral process), with Easley v.
Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001) (finding that North Carolina's 12 congressional
district was drawn based upon voting behavior rather than according to race). See
also Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) (ruling gerrymanders based on race are
not a violation of equal protection so long as they are supported by a compelling
state interest).
378. Miller, 515 U.S. at 913.
379. Compare Vieth, 541 U.S. at 267 (ruling that gerrymandering is not a
justiciable issue before courts because the process of creating districts implicates
numerous political considerations courts cannot enforce), with Shaw, 509 U.S. at
653 (holding that a claim can be made under the Equal Protection Clause that a
redistricting scheme is so irrational on its face that it can only be understood to
segregate voters on the basis of race).
380. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 962-78 (1996) (majority opinion)
(requiring multiple factors to support a finding of predominantly racial
2015]
Law and Inequality
disadvantage a White-Black political coalition and to advantage
the anti-coalition party.
B. A Brief Overview of More Recent Precedent
The Court's Voting Rights Act decisions are often rationalized
by less than a majority, and the result, to put it mildly, is that the
"law" is often far from clear.381 Bush v. Vera,"' is an example. In a
controlling concurring plurality decision, the three Justices in the
plurality announced that should the state legislature voluntarily
decide to create majority-minority districts, it must have "a strong
basis in evidence" that the racial districting is "reasonably
necessary" to comply with Section 2 and must "substantially
address the Section 2 violation.""38 If so, Bush would indicate that
while the legislature has a limited degree of flexibility, it "satisfies
strict scrutiny. '8 4 Still, two of the three plurality Justices in Bush
disagree on whether state legislation intentionally creating a 50%
majority-minority district must pass strict scrutiny, seeming to
leave the question for the future. Justice O'Connor, the author
of the concurring plurality opinion, also wrote her own separate
concurring opinion to answer that strict scrutiny question. (Her
answer was "No.")" Justice Kennedy also addressed the strict
gerrymandering). Justices Scalia and Thomas found strict scrutiny was required
by the intentional creation of majority-minority districts. Id. at 952. Justice
Kennedy suggested-without deciding-"we would no doubt apply strict scrutiny if
a State decreed that certain districts had to be at least 50 percent [W]hite, and our
analysis should be no different if the State so favors minority races." Id. at 996
(Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor concurred specially in her opinion and
would have held that majority-minority districts do not require strict scrutiny "so
long as they do not subordinate traditional districting criteria to the use of race for
its own sake or as a proxy." Id. at 998 (O'Connor, J., concurring). But see Easley v.
Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 258 (2001) (discussing, in reference to majority-minority
districts, that when racial identification is strongly correlated with political
affiliation, the party attacking the boundaries must show that the legislature could
have achieved its legitimate political objectives in alternate ways that are
comparatively consistent with traditional districting principles, and that those
alternatives would have brought about significantly greater racial balance).
381. See Bush, 517 U.S. at 952 (1996).
382. Id. at 977.
383. Id. (finding a "strong basis in evidence" that a majority-minority district "is
reasonably necessary to comply with Section 2" and the racial districting
"substantially addresses the Section 2 violation satisfies strict scrutiny") (emphasis
added) (citations omitted).
384. Id. at 977-78.
385. Id. at 962.
386. Id. at 993 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("States may intentionally create
majority-minority districts, and may otherwise take race into consideration,
without coming under strict scrutiny.")
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scrutiny issue in his concurrence. (His answer was "yes.")87 To
make matters even murkier, two of the three Justices in the
plurality are no longer on the Court and one, Justice O'Connor,
was more supportive of affirmative action than her replacement
(Justice Alito) or than the current court is."' Justices Thomas and
Scalia found that strict scrutiny is clearly required in this
situation.9
With that warning about the murky state of the law, I will
discuss a few cases, some focusing on Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act, and some on the Fourteenth Amendment.
In the 1993 case Voinovich v. Quilter, ° the Ohio Republican-
dominated state apportionment board created several majority-
minority districts. Democratic board members sued, claiming that
creating majority-minority districts where racially polarized voting
did not exist violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. 1 They
won on this claim in the lower court, 2 but the Supreme Court
unanimously reversed, holding that nothing in Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act prevented states from creating majority-
minority districts, even in the absence of racially-polarized voting,
and a plausible Section 2 violation.9 The plaintiffs had not
alleged that the state's conscious use of race violated the
Fourteenth Amendment, nor did the court below address that
issue.' 94
In 1995, in Miller v. Johnson,0 just such an allegation was
made about one of Georgia's congressional districts. The Supreme
Court held that courts must "exercise extraordinary caution in
adjudicating claims that a State has drawn [its] district lines on
the basis of race."' ' Unless the use of race was conceded or clear,
plaintiffs making such a claim are required to show, from a
district's shape or other factors, that race was "the predominant
387. Id. at 996 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("In my view, we would no doubt apply
strict scrutiny if a State decreed that certain districts had to be at least 50 percent
[W]hite, and our analysis should be no different if the State so favors minority
races.").
388. See id. at 982. Two of the dissenters, Justice Souter and Justice Stevens,
are also no longer on the Court.
389. Id. at 999 (Thomas and Scalia, JJ., concurring) (noting that applying strict
scrutiny was "never a close question").
390. 507 U.S. 146 (1993).
391. Id. at 146.
392. Id.
393. Id. at 156.
394. Id. at 157.




factor motivating the legislature's decision."3 7 To show that, the
plaintiff must show that traditional districting principles-
including but not limited to compactness, contiguity, respect for
political subdivisions, or communities of interest-were
subordinated to racial considerations. '9'
In Miller, the Georgia legislature's districting decisions were
based on the Justice Department's reading of Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act, a reading which the Court did not share. 99 The
Court also held that the district court's finding that race was the
predominant motivating factor was not clearly erroneous.0 0 The
Court ultimately struck down the legislature's racial districting
because it was not necessary to avoid liability under the Justice
Department's reading of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act 0 1 since
the Court believed that reading was erroneous.0 2 Thus, the Court
upheld the lower court's finding that Georgia's districting was
clearly based on race03 and therefore violated the Fourteenth
Amendment.4 4
In the 2009 case Bartlett v. Strickland,5 the Court reviewed
North Carolina's creation of a 39% Black voting age population
district from pieces of Pender and other counties. The state
claimed it would be creating a coalition district that would allow
Blacks in the district an opportunity to elect candidates of their
choice06 and that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act mandated the
district.0 If Section 2 mandated the district, as supreme federal
law, Section 2 would trump the state constitution's "Whole County
Provision," which forbade dividing whole counties in state
legislative districting.0  The Whole County Provision is a
397. Id.
398. Id. at 901, 916, 918.
399. Id. at 921. The Court specifically stated that "[t]he congressional plan
challenged here was not required by the Act under a correct reading of the statute."
Id. (emphasis added).
400. Id. at 917.
401. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2012) ("[Any] standard, practice, or procedure with
respect to voting that [diminishes] the ability of any citizens of the United States
on account of race or color ... to elect their preferred candidates of choice denies or
abridges the right to vote.").
402. Miller, 515 U.S. at 921.
403. Id. at 900.
404. Id. at 927.
405. 556 U.S. 1 (2009).
406. Id. at 3, 19.
407. Id. at 6.
408. N.C. CONST. art. II, §§ 3, 5 (discussing Senate Districts and representative
districts respectively). Pender Cnty. v. Bartlett, 361 N.C. 491, 493 (2007). The
Whole County rules provide that "[n]o county shall be divided in the formation of a
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wholesome, though modest, anti-gerrymandering provision that
limits the creativity of partisan map drawers0 -9 except, of course,
when it is trumped by federal law.
In Bartlett, the Court confronted whether "the first Gingles
requirement [for a Section 2 remedy] can be satisfied when the
minority group makes up less than 50 percent of the voting-age
population in the potential election district."' The first
precondition was that the minority group must be "sufficiently
large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a
single-member district ....1 Curiously, the parties had
stipulated that the third precondition had been met-that the
majority must vote as a bloc sufficiently "to enable it ... usually to
defeat the minority's preferred candidate.
4 1 2
New social science data showed that Blacks in the South
could often elect a candidate of their choice with less than a
majority of Blacks of voting age in the district-with less than a
majority-minority district. 3  In light of this, was a majority-
minority district the only type of district legally required under
Section 2? Or could a coalition district or a crossover district-for
example, one where White or other crossover votes would help to
elect the minority candidate-also be required? In other words,
could Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act require the creation of a
coalition district that would simultaneously allow Blacks a
heightened opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice and
foster multiracial cooperation?
Although social science studies suggested that African
American voters in such a district would, with White or other
ethnic crossover votes, be able to elect a candidate of their choice,
the Court in a splintered opinion found that only a majority-
minority district could be justified as required under Section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act. 4  Since Section 2 did not require the
senate [or representative] district." Id.
409. See James A. Gardner, Representation Without Party: Lessons from State
Constitutional Attempts to Control Gerrymandering, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 881, 896
(2006) (speaking to the emergence of new anti-gerrymandering provisions in state
constitutions in the last half-century).
410. Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 12 (2009).
411. Id. (quoting Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986)).
412. Id. at 8 (quoting Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50-51); Pender Cnty., 361 N.C. at 496
(quoting Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50-51).
413. See The Future of Majority-Minority Districts in Light of Declining Racially
Polarized Voting, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2208 (2003).
414. Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 23-24.
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district, as the state supreme court had ruled, the whole county
provision of the state constitution barred its creation 41
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito joined Justice
Kennedy's plurality opinion.416  Justices Thomas and Scalia
concurred on the ground that Section 2 "does not authorize any
vote dilution claim, regardless of the size of the minority
population in a given district." '417 Four Justices dissented, finding
"there is nothing in [Section 2] to suggest that Congress meant to
protect minority opportunity to elect solely by the creation of
majority-minority [districts]."418 Many Voting Rights Act decisions
have a Delphic quality, a quality enhanced when the decision is
derived from a plurality opinion from a deeply and complexly
divided Court.419 Bartlett is a case in point.
Because the Bartlett plurality opinion is technical and
complex, I will summarize its holdings and implications before
discussing it in detail. Logically applied, the plurality opinion
held five things: first, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act does not
require the creation of coalition districts.420 Second, Section 2 does
not provide special protection to the right to form political
coalitions. 21  Third, where a majority-minority district can be
created, such a district is mandated by Section 2 of the act if and
only if the three Gingles preconditions are met and "if [Section] 2
applies based on a totality of the circumstances. 42   Those
circumstances include Blacks' inability in those districts to have
an equal opportunity to elect candidates of their choice.42  From
these three holdings a fourth logically follows: Section 2 does not
mandate the destruction of existing coalition districts where
Blacks have typically and overwhelmingly been able to elect
415. See Stephenson v. Bartlett, 357 N.C. 301, 309-10 (2003) (holding the
district did not follow the previously set Stephenson I factors, including the Whole
County Provision) (referring to Stephenson v. Bartlett, 355 N.C. 354, 373-74
(2002), which sets out the Stephenson I factors and held that the Voting Rights Act
did not in the facts of that case abrogate the Whole County Provision in the North
Carolina Constitution).
416. Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 1.
417. Id. at 26.
418. Id. at 31.
419. See John Schwartz, Between the Lines of the Voting Rights Act Opinion,
N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/06/25/us/
annotated-supreme-court-decision-on-voting-rights-act.html (discussing the 2013
Supreme Court ruling on the Voting Rights Act).
420. Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 13, 19.
421. Id. at 15.
422. Id. at 24.
423. Id. at 20.
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candidates of their choice.424  This is because the Gingles
preconditions are not met in those districts, and the totality of the
circumstances does not show that Blacks lack an equal
opportunity to elect candidates of their choice in those districts.
4 25
Fifth, the Bartlett plurality does not tell us whether an intentional
imposition of dual racial quotas-50%+ Black voting age
population districts and Black legislators in proportion to the
state's Black voting age population-are permissible under the
Fourteenth Amendment; nor does the plurality declare that these
quotas are constitutionally permissible where Section 2 does not
require creating a majority-minority district. In short, Bartlett
neither mandates coalition districts nor grants special protection
to the right to form political coalitions. Still, the Court's plurality
seems to strip the state of any Section 2 protections for destroying
functioning coalition districts by an imposition of racial quotas. It
also leaves open challenges under the Equal Protection Clause.
2 7
In these circumstances, under existing precedent, the North
Carolina dual quotas should be held unconstitutional as applied.
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Bartlett plurality, noted that
imposing a Section 2 remedy on a district requires that minorities
"have less opportunity than other members of the electorate
to ... elect representatives of their choice.42 8  However, he
continued, "because they form only 39 percent of the voting-age
population in District 18, African Americans standing alone have
no better or worse opportunity to elect a candidate than does any
other group of voters with the same relative voting strength.
2
1
While these Black voters could join other minorities or Whites,
they could not elect candidates based on their own votes without
assistance.4 "'
To recognize the Section 2 claim, Justice Kennedy wrote,
would grant minority voters 'a right to preserve their strength for
purposes of forging an advantageous political alliance.-4' ' He
rejected that approach, stating "[niothing in §2 grants special
protection to a minority group's right to form political coalitions.
4 2
424. Id. at 31.
425. Id.
426. Id. at 20.
427. Id. at 21, 24.
428. Id. at 2 (opinion of Kennedy, J.).
429. Id. at 14.
430. Id.
431. Id. at 14-15 (quoting Hall v. Virginia, 385 F.3d 421, 431 (4th Cir. 2004)).
432. Id. at 15.
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Like others, a minority group was 'not immune from the
obligation to pull, haul, and trade to find common political
ground."'433 Nothing in Section 2 required that the minority group
be allowed to "maximize" its political power.434 Of course, if Black
voters are concentrated in a few Black districts, their political
power is minimized and their ability to trade to find common
ground is severely limited.
The plurality noted that Section 2 "is not concerned with
maximizing minority voting strength. 4 '  This observation raises
the converse empirical question: is creating more majority-
minority districts merely a way to minimize minority voting
strength, at least when not required to give minorities an equal
opportunity to elect candidates of their choice? At any rate, the
plurality announced that "as a statutory matter, §2 does not
mandate creating or preserving crossover districts.'3 7
Justice Kennedy continued:
Where an election district could be drawn in which minority
voters form a majority but such district is not drawn, or where
a majority-minority district is cracked by assigning some
voters elsewhere, then-assuming the other Gingles factors are
also satisfied-denial of the opportunity to elect a candidate of
choice is present and a mandatory district is required [by
Section 2].
What, however, is the rule as a constitutional matter? That issue
was not squarely presented in Bartlett .
At any rate, the italicized Section 2 qualification seems clear
enough as presented by Justice Kennedy.4 Indeed, he suggested
that Pender County's proposed Section 2 coalition district could
not meet one of the Gingles preconditions: "It is difficult to see how
the majority-bloc-voting requirement [frustrating the minority's
ability to elect candidates of its choice] could be met in a district
433. Id.
434. Id.
435. See, e.g., Abigail Thernstrom, Redistricting, Race, and the Voting Rights
Act, NAT'L AFF. Spring 2010, at 52, 64, available at http://www.nationalaffairs.com
/publications/detail/redistricting-race-and-the-voting-rights-act (noting that "race-
conscious districting may act as a brake on black political advancement," such
majority-minority districting schemes have not changed much in the the face of
historic disfranchisement).
436. Id. at 23.
437. Id. (emphasis added).
438. Id.
439. Id. at 18-19. See id. at 6 (noting that the question presented was whether
the statute could be used to require majority-minority districting, not deciding the
law as a constitutional matter).
440. Id. at 18-19.
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where, by definition, [Wihite voters join in sufficient numbers with
minority voters to elect the minority's preferred candidate.
'441
Driving the point home, Justice Kennedy suggested there was
some doubt as to whether the proposed district could meet the bloc
voting requirement where 20% of the White voters were expected
to vote for the minority candidate.4 2
In addition to the Bartlett plurality, Supreme Court
precedent supports the proposition that a majority-minority
district is not required by Section 2 where it replaces districts
where the minority has an equal opportunity to elect candidates of
its choice, and certainly not where the prior district is regularly
doing so by comfortable margins, even though the district that is
less than Black minority-majority.
When considering whether to create majority-minority
districts, one might look at the state as a whole.4  If that
approach were used to justify majority-minority districts replacing
districts that were consistently electing the minority's candidate of
choice with less than a 50% minority voting age population, it
would be in serious tension with the Gingles "preconditions" for
transformation of a district.
In Bartlett, both the plurality 46 and the dissent447 recognize
that in some districts the minority voting age population may be
too small or the crossover vote too great to meet the Gingles
preconditions.4 4 8  Because the parties stipulated that the third
Gingles factor was met in Bartlett, the Court did not reach the
question of how much crossover vote would be considered too much
to meet the Gingles precondition.4  In Bartlett, the dissent
441. Id. at 16.
442. Id.
443. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 77 (1986) (holding that "the District
court erred, as a matter of law, in ignoring the significance of the sustained success
[B]lack voters have experienced" in the district and that this "persistent
proportional representation ... is inconsistent with appellees' allegation that
[B]lack voters' ability.., to elect representatives of their choice is not equal to that
enjoyed by the [W]hite majority") (emphasis added); see also Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S.
952, 979, 984 (1996) (noting states also cannot use Section 2 to augment "continued
electoral success").
444. Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 30 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[A] § 2
complaint must look to an entire districting plan (normally, statewide), alleging
that the challenged plan creates an insufficient number of minority-opportunity
districts in the territory as a whole.") (citations omitted).
445. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50.
446. Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 5 (Kennedy, J., plurality).
447. Id. at 26 (Souter, J., dissenting).
448. See id.
449. See id. at 39 n.3 (Kennedy, J., plurality).
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suggested that the plurality failed to grasp and apply the totality
of the circumstances test.
450
Justice Kennedy justified the majority-minority requirement
for a Section 2 district based on the need for workable standards.
45 1
That rule, he said, draws clear standards for the courts and
legislatures. 2 Determining whether potential crossover districts
meet the equal opportunity to elect test would force courts to
struggle with political variables and tie them to race-based
assumptions.4 53 For similar reasons, Justice Kennedy rejected the
proposal of looking at minority voters' strength within a particular
party-for example, requiring only that minority voters constitute
a majority of those voting in the primary of the party that usually
wins in the general election. Of course, as an empirical matter,
if the minority controls the Democratic primary and a substantial
number of Democratic Whites vote for the nominee, that seems to
be a very strong indication that the minority will be able to elect
candidates of its choice. But Justice Kennedy warned that the
courts should be cautious about racial classifications and race-
based predictions.
The concern about race-based predictions is curious. To the
untrained eye, the assumption that a minority-majority district is
necessary so Blacks, for example, can elect candidates of their
choice seems to be a political and race-based prediction. 7
Finally, Justice Kennedy noted, legislatures could in proper
circumstances elect to create crossover districts.4 5 ' For a district
with a substantial minority population, he wrote, "a legislative
determination, based on proper factors, to create two crossover
districts may serve to diminish the significance and influence of
race by encouraging minority and majority voters to work together
toward a common goal. 45'  This option could lead to less racial
isolation. As the Court noted in connection with Section 4 of the
Voting Rights Act, which prohibits retrogression in certain covered
450. Id. at 30-31 (Souter, J., dissenting).
451. Id. at 17 (Kennedy, J., plurality).
452. Id.
453. Id.
454. Id. at 22.
455. See Lichtman Second Aff. at 24, 25, Dickson v. Rucho, No. 11-CVS-16896
(N.C. Super. Ct. 2012).
456. Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 18.
457. See Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1029 (1994) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
458. Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 23.
459. Id. at 23.
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areas,"' "various studies have suggested that the most effective
way to maximize minority voting strength may be to create more
influence or [crossover] districts. 46 1
A portion of Justice Kennedy's complex plurality opinion is
worth quoting at length:
Our holding also should not be interpreted to entrench
majority-minority districts by statutory command, for that,
too, could pose constitutional concerns. States that wish to
draw crossover districts are free to do so where no other
prohibition exists. Majority-minority districts are only
required if all three Gingles factors are met and if § 2 applies
based on a totality of the circumstances. In areas with
substantial crossover voting it is unlikely that the plaintiffs
would be able to establish the third Gingles precondition-bloc
voting by majority voters .... In those areas majority-
minority districts would not be required in the first place; and
in the exercise of lawful discretion States could draw crossover
districts as they deemed appropriate. States can-and in
proper cases should-defend against alleged § 2 violations by
pointing to crossover voting patterns and to effective crossover
districts. Those can be evidence, for example, of diminished
bloc voting under the third Gingles factor or of equal political
opportunity under the § 2 totality-of-the-circumstances
analysis. And if there were a showing that a State
intentionally drew district lines in order to destroy otherwise
effective crossover districts, that would raise serious questions
under both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. There
is no evidence of discriminatory intent in this case, however.
Our holding recognizes only that there is no support for the





Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion was based only on Section 2.463
It did not decide a Fourteenth Amendment challenge and
contained some generalized warnings about racial
classifications.
Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and
Breyer dissented.46 ' For the dissenters:
460. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) (holding 5-4 that the
prohibition was not enforceable because of its limited geographical extent and
because changed conditions).
461. Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 23 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Georgia
v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 482 (2003)).
462. Id. at 23-24 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see Pildes, supra note 353
at 1567 ("Districts could still be designed in such places that encouraged coalitions
across racial lines, but these districts would result from legislative choice,
not ... obligation").
463. Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 24.
464. Id.
465. Id. at 26.
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If districts with minority populations under 50% can never
count as minority-opportunity districts to remedy a violation
of the States' obligation to provide equal electoral opportunity
under § 2, States will be required under the plurality's rule to
pack [B]lack voters into additional majority-minority districts,
contracting the number of districts where racial minorities are




This critique seems to give inadequate weight to Justice
Kennedy's insistence that the third Gingles precondition must
always be satisfied.4 7
According to the dissent, the Court's precedent required
looking first at the Gingles preconditions for a potential district,
and second at the totality of the circumstances in the state as a
whole .4" The starting point would be to compare the number of
districts where minority voters can elect their chosen candidate
with the group's population percentage.4  Though there is no
entitlement to proportional representation or electoral success, the
state is, by this view, under an obligation to look at
proportionality. 70  In a state with a 20% Black voting age
population, for example, Black voters should be "entitled to a
practical chance to compete in a roughly proportionate number of
districts. ,4 1 By the Souter view, recognizing coalition districts as
satisfying the State's Section 2 obligation would reduce
litigation. 2  Since districts where minorities could elect
candidates of their choice with less than 50% minority voting age
population could satisfy the State's obligation, fewer Section 2
suits would be justified. 43  This would allow for "a beneficent
reduction in the number of majority-minority districts with their
'quintessentially race-conscious calculus'... [and] moderating
reliance on race. ,4 4  Integrative, cross-racial alliances were, he
suggested, consistent with the ideal of the Voting Rights Act and
466. Id. at 27 (Souter, J., dissenting).
467. See id. at 16 (Kennedy, J., plurality) for Justice Kennedy's discussion of the
tension crossover districts create with the third Gingles requirement. However,
because the third Gingles requirement was conceded, the Court has no need to
examine this issue.
468. Id. at 29-30.
469. Id. at 29.
470. Id. at 29, n.2.
471. Id.
472. Id. at 43.
473. Id. at 36.
474. Id. at 34. (citation omitted) (quoting Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997,
1020 (1994)).
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the Constitution.475 Both the Kennedy plurality and the dissent
expressed some discomfort with minority-majority districting.476
Earlier, in 1994 in Johnson v. De Grandy,"' the Court
considered a Section 2 claim that the minority vote had been
diluted because the legislature had failed to create as many
minority districts as possible under the Gingles three-part test.
Significantly, the Court found the Gingles preconditions were
necessary but not sufficient to support the creation of more
majority-minority districts.48 Under the totality of the
circumstances, and where minorities represented at or close to
their proportion of the voting age population, the Court did not
find vote dilution.7 The Court noted that reading Section 2 as
requiring the maximum number of minority districts possible
under Gingles "tends to obscure the very object of the statute and
to run counter to its textually stated purpose." 86
The State argued for a rule that proportionality would create
a safe harbor against Section 2 vote dilution claims." 1 The Court
rejected that approach because of "a tendency to promote and
perpetuate efforts to devise majority-minority districts even in
circumstances where they may not be necessary to achieve equal
political and electoral opportunity. ''1 2 After all, the Court noted,
"there are communities in which minority citizens are able to form
coalitions with voters from other racial and ethnic groups, having
no need to be a majority within a single district in order to elect
candidates of their choice. '
Justice Kennedy concurred, but he noted that the decision
was based only on Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, not on
constitutional grounds.' For Section 2 claims, he warned against
both conflating the number of minorities elected to office with the
number of majority-minority districts, and the related assumption
475. Id. at 34 (quoting Pildes, supra note 353, at 1539).
476. Id. at 21 (Kennedy, J., plurality). Justice Kennedy acknowledges the
possibility of an Equal Protection Clause concern regarding whether Section 2
requires the majority-minority rule.
477. 512 U.S. 997 (1994).
478. Id. at 1012.
479. Id. at 1024.
480. Id. at 1016-17.
481. Id. at 1017-18.
482. Id. at 1019-20.
483. Id. at 1020.
484. Id. at 1031 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
2015]
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that only majority-minority districts elect minorities while White-
majority districts do not. 5
Justice Kennedy found proportionality relevant but not
dispositive in a Section 2 claim."'6 But he found proportionality
constitutionally suspect.4 7 He stated:
States might consider it lawful and proper to act with the
explicit goal of creating a proportional number of majority-
minority districts in an effort to avoid §2 litigation. Likewise,
a court finding a §2 violation might believe that the only
appropriate remedy is to order the offending State to engage
in race-based redistricting and create a minimum number of
districts in which minorities constitute a voting majority.488
The Department of Justice might require the same thing for
preclearance under Section 549 Justice Kennedy found such
actions deeply problematic. "Those governmental actions, in my
view, tend to entrench the very practices and stereotypes the
Equal Protection Clause is set against .... As a general matter,
the sorting of persons with an intent to divide by reason of race
raises the most serious constitutional questions. 9 0  He noted,
however, that "no constitutional claims were brought here .... "+9
The challenge to North Carolina's 2011 racially-gerrymandered
redistricting explicitly raises the very constitutional claims about
which Justice Kennedy expressed deep concern. 2
The North Carolina case raises crucial issues. Can the state
legislature use dual quotas to create Black-majority districts, even
though they would not be mandated by the Voting Rights Act,
supposedly to be safe from a Section 2 claim? In a plurality
opinion, the Court said the legislature must have a "strong basis
in evidence" to support a claim that a majority-minority district is
"reasonably necessary to comply with Section 2.,,49' A second issue
that remains is whether the legislature can pursue political
dominance by using race as a proxy for political aims. Since
485. Id. at 1027.
486. Id. at 1028.
487. Id. at 1029.
488. Id.
489. Id.
490. Id. (citation omitted).
491. Id. at 1031.
492. Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 21 (2009) (Kennedy, J., plurality) (stating
that the plurality resolves doubts regarding the necessity of the majority-minority
rule by avoiding the constitutional concerns raised under the Equal Protection
Clause).
493. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 977 (1996) (plurality opinion) (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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Blacks are overwhelmingly Democratic voters, if the end is
political domination, can the legislature use quotas (50% and
50%+ Black districts and proportion in the legislature) and the
concentration of Black voters to undermine the Democratic multi-
racial coalition and eliminate as many White Democrats as
possible for the purpose of securing Republican political
dominance? In short, if the end is political mastery, can the
means be boldly and explicitly racial, whether or not dressed up as
based on the Voting Rights Act?
Part VI. North Carolina's 2011 Redistricting Revisited
As we have seen, in North Carolina, the redistricting process
was complicated and shaped to a considerable extent by use of
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.9 4 The Republican majority in
the legislature, claiming a mandate under Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act, created twenty-three majority-minority State House
districts,4 5  of which thirteen were new majority-minority
districts.9  After the reapportionment, twenty-one districts
elected an African American in 2012. 7  Meanwhile, the
Republicans' plan for the state Senate involved the creation of
nine majority-minority state Senate districts-whereas before
there had been zero-even though seven Senators that were the
choices of Black voters in their prior benchmark districts had been
494. See Dickson v. Rucho, No. 11-CVS-16896, at 12 (N.C. Super. Ct. July 8,
2013).
495. Id. at 24, 28-36. Dickson involved several individual and organizational
plaintiffs who sued North Carolina state officials after the 2011 redistricting,
arguing that the racially gerrymandered districts violated the North Carolina and
United States Constitutions. In one of the many issues raised in this complex case,
the State argued that "packing" Black voters into minority-majority districts was
necessary in order to avoid liability under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.
While the three-judge panel ultimately upheld the redistricting, they found this
particular argument unpersuasive. See id. at 39.
496. Lichtman Second Aff. at 24, tbl.5, Dickson v. Rucho, No. 11-CVS-16896
(N.C. Super. Ct. 2012).
497. Id. at 25. Also compiled from Current District Plans: Lewis-Dollar-
Dockham, N.C. GEN. ASSEMB., http://www.ncleg.net/representation/ContentUPlans
/PlanPageDB_2011.asp?Plan=Lewis-Dollar-Dockham_4&Body=House (last visited
Sept. 28, 2014), and 2013 House Demographics, N.C. GEN. ASSEMB., http://www
.ncleg.net/DocumentSites/HouseDocuments/2013-2014%2OSession/2013%2ODemo
graphics.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2014) [hereinafter 2013 House Demographics].
Three African American representatives were also elected from White-majority
districts. House District 47, in which a majority of the voting age population




elected.9 Ten newly-minted districts elected African American
Senators in 2012 
Section 2 seeks to ensure for Blacks a fair or equal
opportunity5 1 to elect candidates of their choice. So districts with
a substantial Black voting age population that elect Whites who
were the choice of Black voters and districts with less than a
majority Black voting age population electing Black candidates
with White "crossover" votes or coalition votes, should be a cause
for celebration. That, however, was obviously not the view of the
architects of the Republican gerrymander. 1  Nor was the
gerrymander motivated by giving Blacks an equal opportunity to
elect candidates of their choice.
Instead, as we have seen, the Republican plan had two
targeted racial quotas: (1) the number of Black legislators in the
General Assembly should equal the percentage of voting age
Blacks in the state, °50  and (2) where a 50% Black voting age
population district could be created, it should be created
regardless of the previous success of African American candidates
in that district-success achieved without the infusion of more
Black voters.0 4
The case of Senator Garrou graphically illustrates how the
legislature used race. In one 2010 slightly-less-than-majority
Black district, a White state Senator, Linda Garrou, had been the
preferred candidate of most Black voters in 2010 and in prior
elections. This was so when she ran against both Black and White
challengers. Still, the North Carolina Republican legislature
redrew her district to make it majority-minority.506 By a small
498. Dickson, No. 11-CVS-16896, at 24.
499. Compiled from Current District Plans: Rucho Senate 2, N.C. GEN. ASSEMB.,
http://www.ncleg.netrepresentation/ContentPlans/PlanPage-DB_2011 .asp
?Plan=RuchoSenate_2&Body=Senate (last visited Sept. 28, 2014) and 2013 Senate
Demographics, N.C. GEN. ASSEMB., http://www.ncleg.netDocumentSites/Senate
Documents/2013-2014%2OSession/2013%20Senate%2ODemographics.pdf (last
visited Sept. 28, 2014) [hereinafter 2013 Senate Demographics].
500. Voting Rights Act § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2012).
501. See First Amended Complaint at 78, Dickson v. Rucho, No. 11-CVS-16896
(N.C. Super. Ct. July 8, 2013).
502. Id.
503. Dickson v. Rucho, No. 11-CVS-16896, at 14 (N.C. Super. Ct. July 8, 2013).
504. First Amended Complaint at 80, Dickson v. Rucho, No. 11-CVS-16896
(N.C. Super. Ct. July 8, 2013).
505. Garrou Aff. at 5, Dickson v. Rucho, No. 11-CVS-16896 (N.C. Super. Ct.
2012); see also Lichtman First Aff. at 4, Dickson v. Rucho, No. 11-CVS-16896 (N.C.
Super. Ct. 2012); Lichtman Second Aff. at 22, tbl.3, Dickson v. Rucho, No. 11-CVS-
16896 (N.C. Super. Ct. 2012).
506. Lichtman Second Aff. at 25, tbl.6, Dickson v. Rucho, No. 11-CVS-16896
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boundary detour, it also geographically eliminated the White
incumbent, Senator Garrou, from the district.0 7 When discussing
the proposed Republican electoral map, Senator Garrou asked
Senator Robert Rucho, chair of the Republican-controlled
redistricting committee, whether she would have been removed
from the district if she had been Black; Senator Rucho refused to
answer .5 " But when asked the same question in his deposition in
a suit challenging the new districts, Senator Rucho testified that
Garrou would not have been eliminated if she had been a Black
incumbent. 9
Regardless of the prior preferences of African Americans in
her district, Senator Garrou was the wrong color to satisfy the
targeted quota for Black persons in the legislature. 10
Similarly, under the 50% quota, a number of White or other
crossover voters who had been supporting Black candidates had to
be excised from the benchmark districts to make it possible to
fulfill the dual quotas-the 50% or 50%+ Black voting age
population quota and the quota to ensure that African Americans
in the legislature were elected in proportion to the African
American voting population in the state. 11
(N.C. Super. Ct. 2012).
507. Garrou Aff. at 7, Dickson v. Rucho, No. 11-CVS-16896 (N.C. Super. Ct.
2012).
508. Id.
509. Rucho Dep. 193:9-192, Dickson v. Rucho, No. 11-CVS-16896 (N.C. Super.
Ct. July 8, 2013); see also Wesley Young, Garrou, Forsyth Democrat, Won't Run for
Re-Election to State Senate, WINSTON-SALEM J. (Feb. 7, 2012) (reporting that
Senator Linda Garrou, a White Democrat who had served in the state Senate for
over a decade, would not seek re-election after her home was redrawn into an
overwhelmingly White district represented by a long-tenured Republican Senator).
During the refashioning of Garrou's former district, Senator Rucho, the Republican
chairman of the redistricting committee recommended that the "current White
candidate [Garrou] not be included in the proposed District 32" since, in his
opinion, there was no way she could be the candidate of choice of a majority African
American and Hispanic population. Garrou Aft. at 5, Dickson v. Rucho, No. 11-
CVS-16896 (N.C. Super. Ct. 2012). The view is curious, since Garrou had
consistently won the African American vote in her district for over a decade-
decisively defeating both Black and White challengers. Id. In 2012, the new
majority-minority District 32 elected an African American candidate, Earline
Parmon. Senator Parmon had previously served terms in the state House
representing a majority-White district. He was one of a number of Black
legislators to achieve electoral success in racially-diverse districts without the
dubious assistance of the 2011 racial gerrymander. See supra notes 41-45 and
accompanying text.
510. See Rucho Dep. 193:9-192, Dickson v. Rucho, No. 11-CVS-16896 (N.C.
Super. Ct. July 8, 2013).
511. Lichtman Second Aff. at 10, 11, Dickson v. Rucho, No. 11-CVS-16896 (N.C.
Super. Ct. 2012).
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In 2010, more than forty state House and Senate districts
had a substantial, but not majority, Black voting age population.5 12
Still, in 2010 under the prior districting, many of these less-than-
majority-Black districts had been electing Blacks for years with
extremely comfortable majorities.13  In these districts, racial
Section 2 redistricting was not required to give Black voters an
equal chance to elect candidates of their choice. 4 Indeed, expert
analysis showed that in the prior (or benchmark) districts with
40% or more Black voting age populations, Blacks had a 90%
chance of electing a candidate who was the choice of Black
voters. Nor were chances of success increased in districts that
were composed of a voting population that was 50% or 50%+
Black.51  To cite just one example, Senator Floyd McKissick, an
African American Democrat, was elected to represent a Durham
County district with a Black voting age population of 45% by forty-
point margins in 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010.57 But in its 2011
redistricting, the legislature increased the Black voting age
population of heavily Black districts-including Senator
McKissick's-to between 50 and 52%.18
The purported Section 2 racial gerrymander was designed to
create majority Black districts with a Black voting age electoral
majority; the racial gerrymander has had a dramatic effect on
racial polarization between the parties. In 2009, the state House
of Representatives had twenty-two Black Democrats and forty-six
White Democrats.2 There was one Black Republican.2 1 In 2011,
after the Republican sweep in 2010, there were eighteen Black
Democrats and thirty-four White Democrats in the House.
512. Sharon McCloskey, Redistricting 2011: A Solution in Search of a Problem,
N.C. POL'Y WATCH (Feb. 27, 2013, 10:41 AM), http://www.ncpolicywatch.com/2013
/02/27/redistricting-201 l-a-solution-in-search-of-a-problem/.
513. See Berman, supra note 9.
514. Lichtman Second Aff. at 18, 19, Dickson v. Rucho, No. 11-CVS-16896 (N.C.
Super. Ct. 2012).
515. Id. at 6-7, 9; see also Berman, supra note 9.
516. Lichtman Second Aff. at 7-9, Dickson v. Rucho, No. 11-CVS-16896 (N.C.
Super. Ct. 2012).
517. McCloskey, supra note 512.
518. Id.
519. See infra notes 520-522.
520. 2009 House of Representatives Demographics, N.C. GEN. ASSEMB. (Sept. 9,
2010), http://www/ncleg.net/DocumentsSites/HouseDocuments/2009-2010%2OSessi
on/2009%2oDemographics.pdf [hereinafter 2009 House Demographics].
521. Id.
522. 2011 House of Representatives Demographics, N.C. GEN. ASSEMB. (Dec. 12,
2012), http://www.ncleg.net/DocumentSites/HouseDocuments/2011-2012%2OSess
ion/2011%20Demographics.pdf [hereinafter 2011 House Demographics].
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There were no Black Republicans. 23 In 2013, after the 2011 racial
gerrymander, there were twenty-two Black Democrats and
twenty-one White Democrats.5 24  There were still no Black
Republicans in the House.
In the state Senate in 2009, before the Republican sweep,
there were twenty White Democrats and nine Black Democrats;
526
in 2011 (after the Republican sweep but before the gerrymander)
there were seven Black and two White senators who were
preferred by Black voters and twelve White Democrats.5 2 7 There
were no Black Republicans in the Senate. All these Black senators
had been elected in districts with less than 50% Black voting age
population In 2013, after the racial gerrymander, there were
seven White Democrats in the Senate and ten Black Democrats.5 29
In sum, after the gerrymander, White Democrats in the House
dropped from thirty-four in 2011 to twenty-two in 2013.3 In the
Senate, White Democrats dropped from twelve in 2011 to seven in
2013.31 Configuring a "Black Democratic Party" and a "White
Republican Party" was making substantial progress.
5 12
Meanwhile, five Senate districts in which the Black voting age
population ranged from 30% to 35% disappeared. In the House,
six districts in which Blacks had been between 30% and 33% of the
voting age population disappeared. 34
The effect of raising the percentages of the Black voters to
50% and above in districts with less than 50% Black voting age
population that already elected Black representatives by an
523. Id.
524. 2013 House Demographics, supra note 497.
525. Id.
526. 2009 Senate Demographics, N.C. GEN. ASSEMB. (Feb. 11, 2010), available at
http://www.ncleg.net [hereinafter 2009 Senate Demographics].
527. 2011 Senate Demographics, N.C. GEN. ASSEMB. (Oct. 18, 2012), available at
http://www.ncleg.net [hereinafter 2011 Senate Demographics]; see Lichtman Second
Aff. at 22, tbl.3, Dickson v. Rucho, No. 11-CVS-16896 (N.C. Super. Ct. 2012). There
were a total of eight Black senators.
528. Lichtman Second Aff. at 22, tbl.3, Dickson v. Rucho, No. 11-CVS-16896
(N.C. Super. Ct. 2012).
529. See 2013 Senate Demographics, supra note 499.
530. Compare 2011 House Demographics, supra note 522, with 2013 House
Demographics, supra note 497. This may treat Hispanics as "White."
531. Compare 2011 Senate Demographics, supra note 527, with 2013 Senate
Demographics, supra note 499.
532. See supra notes 530-531.
533. See Lichtman Second Aff. at 25, tbl.6, Dickson v. Rucho, No. 11-CVS-16896
(N.C. Super. Ct. 2012).




extremely comfortable margin was not to increase the chances of
Blacks electing candidates of their choice in those districts, much
less to increase their chances having an equal opportunity in those
districts. The effect was to diminish overall Black political
power in the legislature by wasting Black votes and by disrupting
White-Black political coalitions, whether the coalitions had
preferred a White representative, Black representative, or a
representative of a different ethnic origin.36
Increased segregation of Black voters in these 40% or 40%+
into 50% or 50%+ Black voting age population districts (1) was not
required by Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, with its reference
to equal opportunity and its rejection of requiring
proportionality;537 (2) was not needed to produce the election of
Blacks in those districts; 5" and (3) diminished overall Black power
in the legislature .5 9  All these effects were achieved by (4) explicit
use of racial quotas and numerical targets by drawing district
lines to include or exclude voters and sometimes candidates from
districts because of race. 40 Collectively all these elements describe
"steroid districts. 41
Part VII. The North Carolina 2011 Racial Gerrymander
Goes to Court
After the 2011 North Carolina gerrymander, a number of
voters affected by the racial gerrymander filed suit, alleging,
among other claims, a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment by
racial districting that unnecessarily packed Black voters into 50%
or 50%+ state legislative and federal congressional districts. 2
535. Id. at 18-19.
536. Id.
537. See supra note 480.
538. See supra notes 513-514.
539. Lichtman Second Aff. at 18, Dickson v. Rucho, No. 11-CVS-16896 (N.C.
Super. Ct. 2012).
540. See First Amended Complaint, at 6, Dickson v. Rucho, No. 11-CVS-16896
(N.C. Super. Ct. July 8, 2013); Garrou Aff. at 6-7, Dickson v. Rucho, No. 11-CVS-
16896 (N.C. Super. Ct. 2012).
541. See Mock, supra note 35.
542. Rounded to the nearest whole number, the legislature made one House
district 57% BVAP, one 55%, two 54%, two 53%, three 52%, twelve 51%, one 50%,
two 45%, and one 32%. By concentrating the Black votes, the legislature was able
not only to increase the number of Black majority districts from ten to twenty-
three, but also to eliminate six of the eleven districts ranging from 37% to 30%
BVAP. It was able to raise two more 37% BVAP to 50% districts. Lichtman Second
Aff. at 24, tbl.5, Dickson v. Rucho, No. 11-CVS-16896 (N.C. Super. Ct. 2012). In the
state Senate, there had been no majority Black districts, but seven Blacks were
still elected to the Senate. The legislature created nine majority Black voting age
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Those in control of redistricting in the legislature claimed
that in these purported Section 2 districts, racial districting was
required by the Voting Rights Act; putting 50% or 50%+ Black
voting age population in the districts was the way to comply with
both Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the judicial precedent
interpreting Section 2 .5" And if not exactly required, it was
justified as a "safe harbor"-a way to avoid Section 2 and Section 5
challenges, neither of which had been made in the state for nearly
thirty years. 44
In Pender County v. Barlett, the North Carolina Supreme
Court held that where a Section 2 district was ordered by the
court, it can only be a majority-minority district As we saw in
Bartlett v. Strickland, a controlling plurality of the Supreme Court
said the same thing. Moving beyond precedent, 7 the legislature
sought to ensure that the percentage of Blacks in the legislature
would reflect the percent of Blacks in the voting age population.
The legislature fulfilled its quota admirably, though it did not call
it that .5  The percent of African Americans in the legislature was
as close as possible to the African American percent of the state's
Black voting age population.
The legislature's dual quota (the 50% or 50%+ quota and the
proportionality quota) is, to put it mildly, in serious tension with
recent Supreme Court precedent.550  The Court has found explicit
racial balancing or quotas to be a violation of the Fourteenth
population districts, and one 42.53% district. The redistricting eliminated five
districts where the Black voting age population ranged from 30% to 35%. Id. at 25,
tbl.6.
543. Dickson v. Rucho, No. 11-CVS-16896, at 30-31 (N.C. Super. Ct. July 8,
2013).
544. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (deciding a challenge to North
Carolina's multimember districts under the Voting Rights Act); Stephenson v.
Bartlett, 562 S.E.2d 377, 398 (N.C. 2002) (holding the redistricting plan adopted by
the General Assembly invalid under the State Constitution instead of §§ 2 or 5 of
the Voting Rights Act).
545. Pender Cnty. v. Bartlett, 649 S.E.2d 364, 376 (N.C. 2007).
546. See Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 24 (2009) (holding that majority-
minority districts are required where all three Gingles factors are present, and
Section 2 applied based on the totality of the circumstances).
547. The Court has suggested that proportionality may be a defense against a
Section 2 action, but has never required such a quota. See id.
548. Dickson v. Rucho, No. 11-CVS-16896, at 26-27 (N.C. Super. Ct. July 8,
2013).
549. Proportionality Chart, Dickson v. Rucho, No. 11-CVS-16896 (N.C. Super.
Ct. 2012). See Brief of Plaintiff, Dickson v. Rucho, 11-CVS-16896 (N.C. Super. Ct.
July 8, 2013).




Amendment in a number of settings.55 1  As the Court noted in
Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, "outright racial
balancing.., is patently unconstitutional. 5 5 2 In Parents Involved
v. Seattle School District No. 1,5 the Court warned that
"[aiccepting racial balancing as a compelling state interest would
justify imposing racial proportionality throughout American
society 55'4  and "would support indefinite use of racial
classifications .... " In the voting rights context, the Court has
explained that neither Section 2 nor Section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act requires proportionality between the percentage of African
Americans in the state and the percentage of districts in which
Blacks are a majority of the voting age population.
If legislatures enact or courts sanction such use of
proportionality as compliance with Section 2, their actions are also
in serious tension with the text of Section 2 . It provides that
"nothing in this Section establishes a right to have members of a
protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the
population. 5 5 8 It protects an equal opportunity, not a certainty, to
elect.5 59  Black and White Democratic losses in 2010 were roughly
proportional.
As we see in the following calculations, the 2012 voting bloc
that frustrated the ability of African Americans to elect the
candidates of their choice was absent in at least 90% of races in
the benchmark districts that the legislature transformed. In 2010,
in the state House elections for districts that were between 40%
and 49% Black voting age population, the minority candidate was
successful in ten of eleven of the races. That same year, in the
eight state Senate races in districts with between 40% and 49%
BVAP, the minority candidate of choice won seven races. 1 In one
race, the candidate of choice was a White woman who defeated her
551. In the context of education, see infra notes 552-555. In the context of
voting rights, see infra note 556.
552. 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2119 (2013) (citations omitted).
553. 551 U.S. 701, 705 (2007).
554. Id. at 730.
555. Id. at 731 (quoting Metro Broad. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990)).
556. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S.
997 (1994).
557. See Voting Rights Act § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2012).
558. Id.
559. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (b). In addition, the statute's goal of equal opportunity to
elect could cast doubt on super-safe districts.
560. See supra Figure 1 and note 17.
561. Lichtman Second Aff. at 22, tbl.3, Dickson v. Rucho, No. 11-CVS-16896
(N.C. Super. Ct. 2012).
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Black challengers with most of the Black vote on her side. Two
of the purported Section 2 benchmark congressional districts, with
43.8% and 48.6% Black voting age population, had been electing
the Black candidates of choice with less than 50% Black voting age
population, and typically by very large majorities.
In a breathtaking anti-coalition racial gerrymander, the
legislature destroyed virtually all of the state House, state Senate,
and congressional districts in which a multi-racial coalition had
been electing candidates preferred by minority voters.5 4  The
assault on inter-racial coalitions did not end there, of course.5 5 By
removing Black voters from districts that had been electing White
Democrats, the legislature reduced Black political influence in
those districts and in the legislature as a whole, and engineered
the defeat of Whites elected with Black support-striking an
additional blow at inter-racial cooperation. It also struck a blow
for the goal of racial polarization, transforming parties into more
nearly Black and White political parties with legislators serving
increasingly segregated districts.5 7 The result, in the prophetic
words of Justice Kennedy, "tend[s] to entrench the very practices
and stereotypes the Equal Protection Clause is set against. ,5 8 Of
course, these actions had political advantages for one political
party.59  So did the tactics used to disrupt the White-Black
Republican coalition in the 19 h and early 20 h Centuries.
Segregation was a tool that helped to disrupt White-Black political
association and cooperation. 1 It will be ironic if the courts allow
legislatures to achieve similar effects under the Voting Rights Act
in the absence of any compelling need.
For convenience, I will refer to these less than 50% districts
that regularly elected the Black candidate of choice as "benchmark
districts." The plaintiffs' challenges included twenty-one of these
40%+ benchmark legislative and congressional districts in their
562. Id.
563. Id. at 8-9, 23, tbl.4.
564. Id. at 20-25, tbls.1-6.
565. For discussion on the different ways in which Republican leaders attacked
interracial coalitions, see infra notes 590-95 and accompanying text.
566. Lichtman Second Aff. at 26, tbl.7, Dickson v. Rucho, No. 11-CVS-16896
(N.C. Super. Ct. 2012).
567. See supra note 397.
568. Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1029 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
569. First Amended Complaint, at 78-80, Dickson v. Rucho, No. 11-CVS-
16896 (N.C. Super. Ct. July 8, 2013).




suit against the 2011 North Carolina reapportionment and racial
gerrymander. Each of these districts had been inflated to 50% or
more Black voting age population based on the 2010 census-in
spite of the fact that White-Black coalitions rendered the bulking
up unnecessary for Black voters to have an equal opportunity to
elect the candidates of their choice.5 ' The 2010 success rate for
Blacks' candidates of choice was no better in districts with 50% or
greater Black voting age population.5 4  According to Professor
Lichtman, the main result of the extra racial packing was to
diminish the ability of African American voters to influence the
political process across the state of North Carolina
The Trial Court's Opinion
The plaintiffs' complaint, filed in state court, came before
three superior court judges appointed by the Chief Justice .5 " The
judges faced a large record. 7
The trial court noted the undisputed facts: (1) the legislature
intended to create twenty-six of the thirty challenged districts as
voting rights districts; (2) these were designed by the legislature to
include [at least] a 50% total Black voting age population; (3) this
required including a targeted number of Black voters in such
districts and excluding a targeted number of White voters;5 11 (4) in
addition, the legislature sought to "achieve a 'roughly
proportionate' [actually nearly exactly proportionate] number of
senate, house, and congressional districts as compared to the
572. See Lichtman Second Aff. at 20, 22, 23, tbls.1, 3 & 4, Dickson v. Rucho, No.
11-CVS-16896 (N.C. Super. Ct. 2012). Of these twenty-one 40%+ benchmark
districts, eleven were state House districts, eight were state Senate districts, and
two were congressional districts.
573. Id. at 24, tbl.5. In fact, the candidates preferred by Black voters had a 90%
chance of winning the elections. Based on the 2010 census, the percentage of Black
voting age population in the newly-enacted House districts are as followed: seven
were above 53%; eleven were between 51.83% and 51.11%; four were between
50.69% and 50.45%; two were roughly 45%; and one was at 32%. As expert witness
Allan J. Lichtman demonstrated, because of crossover voting and the multi-racial
coalitions, a benchmark district in the 2010 election with at least a 40% or 40%+
Black voting age population provided Black voters with a 90% or greater chance of
electing the candidate of their choice in state legislative races. That number
becomes 100% in the federal congressional races. See Lichtman First Aff. at 7, 8,
tbls.1 & 3, Dickson v. Rucho, No. 11-CVS-16896 (N.C. Super. Ct. 2012).
574. Lichtman Second Aff. at 9, Dickson v. Rucho, No. 11-CVS-16896 (N.C.
Super. Ct. 2012).
575. Id. at 9.
576. Dickson v. Rucho, No.11-CVS-16896, at 5 (N.C. Super. Ct. July 8, 2013).
577. See id. at 19-20 (itemizing the legislative record).
578. Id. at 14-15.
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Black population in North Carolina.5 7 ' The legislature admittedly
had made a racial classification with numerical quotas and
targets-not too few Blacks and not too many Whites in the
district and a quota of Black legislators .5 6  The trial court found
that:
[E]ven though ... the legislative intent may have been
remedial and the districts may have been drawn to conform
with federal and state laws to provide Black voters in those
districts with an opportunity to elect their preferred candidate
of choice, the shape, location, and racial composition of each
VRA district was predominately determined by racial
581
objective ....




The rule in this situation should be that the state has to have
a compelling state interest pursued by narrowly tailored means in
order to justify its explicit use of racial classifications. 3 Moreover,
when the state has admittedly used race as its predominant
criteria, the burden to show a compelling state interest and
narrow tailoring should be on the state54
The State contended that its compelling state interest was to
comply with Section 2, to protect the State from possible liability
under Section 2, and to assure preclearance under Section 5
Curiously, the Section 5 requirement was no longer
constitutionally enforceable at the time of the trial court's
decision.
Although preclearance had been abrogated under the Shelby
County8 decision by the time of the trial court's decision and, at
any rate, there was no evidence that significant retrogression
would have occurred as a result of preserving coalition districts,
the trial court said the legislature had to have a "strong basis in
evidence to conclude that the new districts, as drawn, were
579. Id.
580. See id.
581. Id. at 15.
582. Id.
583. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 958-59 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S.
900, 904-06 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993).
584. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2420 (2013).
585. Dickson v. Rucho, No.11-CVS-16896, at 16 (N.C. Super. Ct. July 8, 2013).
586. Compare Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (decided June 25,
2013), with Dickson, No.11-CVS-16896 at 21.
587. 133 S. Ct. at 2631 (2013). So it seems the legislature, when it purportedly
relied on the Section 5 rationale, was acting on a mistake of law.
588. See Lichtman Second Aff. at 6, 7, Dickson v. Rucho, No. 11-CVS-16896
(N.C. Super. Ct. 2012) (indicating minority voters within challenged district
already were consistently electing their preferred candidate).
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reasonably necessary to avoid Section 2 liability and to obtain
preclearance under Section 5 of the VRA., 8  The trial court
recognized that the Gingles ° factors "are a mandatory
precondition to any § 2 claim against the state .. 1... 5  These
factors are: "(1) a minority group exists within the area affected by
the Enacted Plans and that the group is sufficiently large and
geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-
member district; (2) that the group is politically cohesive; and (3)
that racial bloc voting usually will work to defeat the minority's
preferred candidate. 9 2 The trial court found as a matter of law
"that the General Assembly had a strong basis in evidence to
conclude that each of the Gingles preconditions was present in
substantial portions of North Carolina and that, based upon the
totality of the circumstances, VRA districts were required to
remedy against vote dilution.'
Since proportionality would be a defense against a Section 2
claim, 4 the trial court held it was entirely appropriate for the
legislature to establish "rough" (actually close to perfect)
proportionality.9  Furthermore, the trial court noted that
polarized voting was present in virtually all the plaintiffs'
challenged districts. 7  Under the law, however, the Gingles
preconditions and opportunity to elect, rather than some
generalized concept of racially-polarized voting, should control the
outcome.
The trial court correctly noted the plaintiffs' contention: as to
the challenged districts where minorities were winning with less
than 50% Black voting age population, the Voting Rights Act did
not require that the purported Voting Rights Act districts be made
up of 50% or more Black voting age population .59  The trial court
responded that the Voting Rights Act did mandate minority-
majority districts in districts where the Voting Rights Act required
589. Dickson, No.11-CVS-16896, at 18 (citations omitted).
590. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986).
591. Dickson, No.11-CVS-16896, at 18 (citations omitted).
592. Id. at 18 (citing Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 978 (1996); Johnson v. De
Grandy 512 U.S. 997, 1006-09 (1994); Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 40, 41
(1993)); see also Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50-51.
593. Dickson, No.11-CVS-16896, at 20-21 (emphasis added).
594. Id. at 26-27.
595. Id. at 27-28.
596. See id. at 37-38.
597. Id. at A-82.
598. Id. at 29.
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a Section 2 district.59 According to the trial court, where there is a
Section 2 violation, a minority-majority district is the only
appropriate remedy.0 0 That seems to be the current law under
Section 2.01 But it is not on point. The constitutional challenge to
the systematic destruction of coalition districts in the present case,
in contrast, is a case of first impression.
The trial court's opinion begs the question. It assumes that
racially-polarized voting existed in the benchmark districts and
therefore the Gingles preconditions were met.0 2 That, however, is
not the law.0 The third Gingles precondition is met if (and only
if) voting is sufficiently polarized in the districts in question to
usually defeat the minority's preferred candidate. 4 The trial
court did not find that the minority's preferred candidate was
usually being defeated in the benchmark districts. In those
challenged districts that were less than 50% minority-majority
BVAP, the minority's preferred candidate was winning 90% of the
time, and typically winning by quite a lot.0 Even in districts with
30% BVAP, minorities in certain districts had a 50-50 chance of
winning-winning in good years, losing in bad.0 7  A few Black
Democratic North Carolina legislative incumbents lost in 2010,
but so did a much larger number of White Democratic
incumbents.0 Equal opportunity is, or should be, a two-way
street.
So the issue as to the areas and districts where Blacks'
preferred candidates consistently won with 40 or 40%+ of the vote
should not have been "what kind of minority-majority district does
Section 2 require?" Instead, it should have been, "in this situation
does Section 2 require a minority-majority district?" with the
599. See id. at 32-33.
600. Id.
601. Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 17-18 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (plurality opinion).
602. See Dickson, No. 11-CVS-16898, at 10.
603. Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 8-9 (2009) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(plurality opinion).
604. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986).
605. See Dickson, No. 11-CVS-16896, at A-92-A-151 (discussing district-by-
district analysis of racial polarization and opportunities for minorities to elect their
preferred candidate in 2011 Voting Rights Act districts).
606. Lichtman Second Aff. at 6, 7, Dickson v. Rucho, No. 11-CVS-16896 (N.C.
Super. Ct. 2012).
607. Id. at 10-12 (discussing Black voters' electoral success in districts with
Black voting age population between 12% and 40%).
608. See Dickson, No. 11-CVS-16896, at A-78 (noting that in 2010, two African
American incumbents were defeated in majority White districts); see also Bonner &
Biesecker, supra note 3 (detailing overall Democratic electoral defeat in the
General Assembly for that election cycle).
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attendant undermining of coalition districts. The answer should
have been "no," because the minority's preferred candidate was
winning consistently and handily with crossover or coalition
votes. 9 Wherever that is the case, then as a matter of law, there
should be no Section 2 defense against the plaintiffs claim that
Equal Protection has been violated by a use of racial
classifications, numerical targets, and quotas. 1 ' For such areas,
quotas, numerical racial targets, excision (because of her race) of a
White incumbent who was the candidate of choice of minorities in
her district, racial decisions to add and subtract voters based on
race, and similar strategies should be impermissible.
The legally correct Section 2 analysis and better holding
would be that, in districts where polarized voting does not block
the ability of minorities to elect the candidates of their choice, the
Voting Rights Act does not require these districts to become
majority-minority districts." This is consistent with a number ofmajriy-mno612" with
Supreme Court decisions 2 and with the controlling plurality
opinion of Bartlett."3  It is also consistent with the Bartlett
dissent's recognition that in some districts crossover voting or
coalitions will preclude Section 2 liability. 4 And it is consistent
with the rule of construing statutes, where reasonable to do so, to
avoid grave constitutional questions. 15  So the systematic
destruction of crossover or coalition districts cannot be shielded
from the force of the Equal Protection Clause by a purported
compelling interest under Section 2 to give Black voters in those
districts an equal opportunity to select candidates of their choice-
609. See Lichtman Second Aff. at 6, 7, Dickson v. Rucho, No. 11-CVS-16896
(N.C. Super. Ct. 2012).
610. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 31 (1986) ("Stated succinctly, a bloc
voting majority must usually be able to defeat candidates supported by a politically
cohesive, geographically insular minority group [to raise a claim under § 2].")
(emphasis original).
611. See id.
612. See id.; see also Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965) (indicating
courts should consider if an "apportionment scheme ... would operate to minimize
or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting
population").
613. See Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 11-12 (2009) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) ("In a § 2 case, only when a party has established the Gingles
requirements does a court proceed to analyze whether a violation has occurred.")
(citations omitted).
614. See id. at 43-44 (Souter, J., dissenting).
615. See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis,
J., concurring) ("The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question, although
properly presented, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case
may be disposed of.").
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an opportunity they had without the dual quotas, without racial
sorting voters, and without eliminating candidates from districts
based on race. 16 In such districts a safe harbor argument is
preposterous-a super-safe district does not require a safe harbor
where the harbor is already safe. At any rate, equal opportunity
to elect is not refuted by the fact that Black, like White, incumbent
Democrats can sometimes lose.
But if Section 2 is construed to require or justify systematic
destruction of these coalitions or crossover districts that were
electing candidates preferred by Black voters, it should be
declared unconstitutional as applied. The explicit racial quotas
would be left with no legitimate justification.
That rule of law is also the better rule because it would
reduce the number of districts racially segregated or justified by
law between majority-minority districts and the rest, based on
race-based quotas, numerical racial goals, etc. 17 It will allow
Blacks and Whites and people of other backgrounds to continue to
form political coalitions in those districts. 8 And it will prevent or
discourage their systematic disruption by racial classifications and
racial quotas.1 In the situation where racial coalitions have been
allowing Blacks or minorities to elect their candidate of choice,
there is no compelling interest favoring the disruption of
coalitions. 2 ' That is so because the Section 2 preconditions do not
apply or even arguably apply.' The issue here is not whether
Section 2 requires the creation of coalition districts; the Court
holds it does not. Instead, the issue is whether the systematic
616. See Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 11-12 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (plurality opinion).
617. Approving the legislature's approach will realize the dire prediction of
Justice Souter, a prediction that seems to be averted by the Gingles precondition.
Cf id. at 27 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("If districts with minority populations under
50% can never count as minority-opportunity districts ... [s]tates will be
required ... to pack black voters into additional majority-minority districts,
contracting the number of districts where racial minorities are having success in
transcending racial divisions in securing their preferred representation.").
618. See Lichtman Second Aff., Dickson v. Rucho, No. 11-CVS-16896 (N.C.
Super. Ct. 2012).
619. See id.
620. See Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 909 (1996) ("While the States and their
subdivisions may take remedial action when they possess evidence of past or
present discrimination, they must identify that discrimination ... with some
specificity before they may use race-conscious relief.") (citations omitted) (emphasis
added). Because African Americans were consistently succeeding in electing their
preferred candidate, the State had no basis for taking "remedial" action.
621. See Dickson v. Rucho, No.11-CVS-16896, at A-92-A-151 (N.C. Super. Ct.
July 8, 2013) (record does not substantiate claim of substantial evidence). But see
id. at 20-21 (concluding as a matter of law the Gingles preconditions did apply).
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destruction of previously existing coalition districts, effectuated by
dual quotas, mistaken readings of Section 2, and preposterous
claims of safe harbors, violates the Fourteenth Amendment. That
is an issue the Court has not yet decided.
22
In its reply brief to the plaintiffs' appeal, the defense makes
two arguments in favor of bypassing the strict scrutiny analysis
necessitated by the Fourteenth Amendment.123  First, it claimed
that strict scrutiny was not appropriate because the trial court
erroneously found that race predominated in the creation of the
"steroid districts"; instead, it said, the districts were created using
racial means (purportedly Section 2 means) for political ends. 4
The defendants cited the 2001 case of Easley v. Cromartie,5 where
the five-justice majority wrote that "where majority-minority
districts are at issue ... the party attacking the legislative
boundaries must show at least that the legislature could have
achieved its legitimate political objectives in alternative ways that
are comparably consistent with traditional districting principles"
and that would have "brought about significantly greater racial
balance. 2  The majority framed the issue as whether the
legislature drew District 12's boundaries "because of race rather
than because of political behavior .... ,
6 2 7
As a matter of fact, Republicans did have some political
objectives in their use of gerrymandering, but all of the objectives
were inseparable from race: districts were to be 50% or more
Black voting age population;6 28 the target was to have Blacks in the
legislature in proportion to their share of the voting age
population;629 the "steroid districts" were shaped so they destroyed
pre-existing multi-racial and multi-ethnic coalitions;630 and they
622. Compare Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 15 ("Nothing in § 2 grants special protection
to a minority group's right to form political coalitions.") (emphasis added), and id.
at 19 ("No federal court of appeals has held that § 2 requires creation of coalition
districts.") (emphasis added), with id. at 23-24 (see supra note 274 and
accompanying text), and Dickson, No.11-CVS-16896 at 34 ("Plaintiffs express grave
concerns regarding the public policy implications of a bright-line 50% rule that they
fear . . . discourages cross-over coalitions among the races.") (emphasis added).
623. See Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 60-64, Dickson v. Rucho, No. 201PA12-2
(N.C. Dec. 6, 2013); id. at 138 n.2.
624. See id. at 60-64.
625. 532 U.S. 234, 258 (2001).
626. Id.
627. Id. at 257 (emphasis original).
628. Dickson v. Rucho, No.11-CVS-16896, at 14 (N.C. Super. Ct. July 8, 2013).
629. Id.
630. See id. at 35 ("[In its effort to avoid liability under § 2 of the VRA, the
General Assembly eschewed crossover districts.").
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were constructed to help to rid as many White Democrats as
possible 31-advancing racial polarization between a Black party
and a White party (a historic goal in Southern Republican
districting.)3 2 The record of racial design is clear. If a party seeks
racial polarization by racial means for political purposes, that
should not sanitize the use of race. The case of Linda Garrou
disproves "innocent" political objectives. There, the undisputed
facts show she was removed from her senatorial district because
she was a White incumbent Democrat rather than a Black
incumbent Democrat. 4
If these racial methods can be sanitized by a political
objective, perhaps the poll tax, the literacy test and other
historical barriers to Black franchise should be rethought. These
mechanisms similarly degraded Black voting for political reasons,
namely because African Americans voted Republican and allied
with Populists. 635
The defendants' second contention relied largely on Shaw v.
Reno: because the legislature itself imposed the Black majority
districts, it need only articulate a "strong basis in evidence" of the
need to act to avoid Section 2 liability.63 6 Though conceding the
state supreme court had previously required the state to bear the
burden of establishing the Gingles preconditions in a Section 2
challenge, 7 the defense maintained, "the [state's burden is one of
production rather than of proof. 63'  Accordingly, it should not be
"held to as high of a standard as one bringing a § 2 challenge
would be.63 By this approach, because the legislature, not a
court, decided on the racial districting constructed with dual racial
631. See Garrou Aff. at 6, Dickson v. Rucho, No. 11-CVS-16896 (N.C. Super. Ct.
2012); see also Lichtman Second Aff. at 6, 7, Dickson v. Rucho, No. 11-CVS-16896
(N.C. Super. Ct. 2012).
632. See Edsall, supra note 59.
633. See Garrou Aff. at 6, Dickson v. Rucho, No. 11-CVS-16896 (N.C. Super. Ct.
2012).
634. Id. at 6.
635. See, e.g., BECKEL, supra note 116, at 3; ESCOTT, supra note 102, at 148;
Pildes, supra note 117, at 302 (detailing historical conservative opposition to Black-
White political coalitions in the Republican Party and Populist movement).
636. See Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 138 n.62, Dickson v. Rucho, No.
201PA12-2 (N.C. Dec. 6, 2013) (quoting Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 899, 910
(1996); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 275 (1986)).
637. See id. Pender Cnty. v. Bartlett, 649 S.E.2d 364, 367-68 (N.C. 2007).
638. Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 138 n.62, Dickson v. Rucho, No. 201PA12-2
(N.C. Dec. 6, 2013) (citing Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408, 436 (E.D.N.C. 1996)
rev'd on other grounds, Shaw, 517 U.S. 899 (1996)).
639. Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 138 n.62, Dickson v. Rucho, No. 201PA12-2
(N.C. Dec. 6, 2013).
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quotas, a more permissive test is adopted for analysis of the
Gingles preconditions. 40
Most Justices have expressed discomfort with decisions to
impose racial classifications under the Voting Rights Act.41 Court
decisions are increasingly hostile to "benign" affirmative action,
racial quotas, and numerical targets. 2 It will be a sad irony if the
only acceptable use of racial quotas is to facilitate racially packing
Blacks and expelling Whites from selected districts with the effect
of isolating Blacks and degrading their political influence.
Still, the strongest argument for allowing the legislature to
create majority-Black districts, even where the evidence for the
Gingles pre-conditions should not satisfy a court, is to protect
legislatures that choose minority-majority districts-both to
protect them from being sued if they fail to act and from being
sued if they act on their own. 4 3 Adopting a watered-down version
of strict scrutiny (or none at all) protects legislatures against
verdicts in suits challenging majority-minority districts they freely
choose to create-though at the expense of perpetuating racial
districting whether or not it is required by the Act. Courts could
transcend this problem by giving substantial deference to the
view, supported by "strong evidence," that racial districting with
640. See Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 138 n.62, Dickson v. Rucho, No.
201PA12-2 (N.C. Dec. 6, 2013); see also Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
641. See, e.g., Bush, 517 U.S. at 1002-03 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("I am
content to reaffirm ... that all racial classifications by government must be strictly
scrutinized ... even in the sensitive area of state legislative redistricting."); id. at
1031 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("I note that in most contexts racial classifications
are invidious because they are irrational."); Shaw, 517 U.S. at 907 (Rehnquist,
C.J.) ("Racial classifications are antithetical to the Fourteenth Amendment ....");
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993) (O'Connor, J.) ("Racial classifications of any
sort pose the risk of lasting harm to our society .... Racial classifications with
respect to voting carry particular dangers."); id. at 663 (White, J., dissenting)
("[D]ividing racial classifications between the 'benign' and the malicious [is] an
enterprise which.., the Court has treated with skepticism.").
642. See, e.g., Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration &
Immigrant Rights & Fight for Equal. by Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct.
1623, 1637-38 (2014) (finding Michigan constitutional amendment prohibiting
affirmative action in educating, employment, and contracting acceptable under the
Equal Protection Clause); Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 21 (2009) (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (plurality opinion) ("[T]he moral imperative of racial neutrality is
the driving force of the Equal Protection Clause, and racial classifications are
permitted only as a last resort.") (citations omitted).
643. See Dickson v. Rucho, No.11-CVS-16896, at 18 (N.C. Super. Ct. July 8,
2013) ("[T]he trial court is required to defer to the General Assembly's reasonable
fears of, and their reasonable efforts to avoid, § 2 liability.") (citations omitted).
644. Cf. Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979) (holding that
under strict scrutiny any "racial classification, regardless of purported motivation,
is presumptively invalid and can be upheld only upon an extraordinary
justification") (citations omitted).
[Vol. 33: 53
STRUGGLE FOR POLITICAL MASTERY
its quotas and proportions is not required to avoid liability under
Section 2 where African Americans had enjoyed a very high degree
of success in the prior districts. 45  Of course, changes required to
comply with one-person, one-vote will require population shifts,
making it possible that some previously successful African
American (and White) candidates may sometimes lose. 46 But the
Voting Rights Act guarantees equal opportunity, not success.
Reasonable modifications of prior districts should not give rise to a
successful suit.
So what should happen on redistricting these benchmark
districts now transformed into "steroid districts?" At a minimum,
since Section 2 should not apply unless one-person, one-vote
requires breaking up counties. North Carolina's Constitution,
with its anti-gerrymander Whole County Provision, should control
state legislative redistricting. New weird tentacles reaching out of
these districts and dividing precincts and city blocks to pick up a
few extra Blacks and remove Whites should be fatally suspect.
Taking incumbents out of their old benchmark districts solely
based on race should be prohibited. That is so even when dual
racial quotas and the related quota-driven decision to prevent
Blacks from voting again for their White incumbent state Senator
are used for political purposes. The dual quotas with their bulked
up "steroid" minority-majority districts are designed to advance a
racial political gerrymander that violates the Whole County
Provision of the North Carolina Constitution. Efforts to destroy a
Black-White coalition is an old and ugly story in North Carolina
and not one courts should support repeating.
Someday, courts should act to restore meaningful
representative democracy and a republican form of government by
not approving gerrymanders that allow minorities that win a
majority one election to transform themselves into an entrenched
majority. That rule should apply in all states and to all temporary
political majorities-Democratic, Republican, or otherwise. It
645. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Lamone, 831 F. Supp. 2d 887, 899-900 (D. Md. 2011)
affd. 133 S. Ct. 29 (2012) (indicating that African American electoral success in
coalition districts undermines an affirmative finding of the third Gingles
precondition); Baldus v. Members of Wis. Gov't Accountability Bd., 849 F. Supp. 2d
840, 857 (E.D. Wis. 2012) (indicating an evidentiary finding that a proposed district
would operate as a coalition district would not corroborate a Section 2 violation);
see also Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 898 (noting that a state's failure to create the
maximum number of majority-minority districts does not expose that state to
Section 2 liability).
646. See, e.g., Dickson v. Rucho, No. 11-CVS-16896, at A-78 (N.C. Super. Ct. July




should apply under the North Carolina Constitution and under the
United States Constitution. 
6 47
To the extent that Section 2 forbids unnecessary racial
packing, it still has an important defensive role to play-pre-
empting still worse disruptions of multi-racial coalitions. The
perverse use of Section 2 to justify racial packing in super-safe
districts should be prohibited, either by construing Section 2 to
avoid a serious constitutional question or by holding such
applications are unconstitutional as applied.
Transforming the benchmark districts into majority-minority
districts to serve some supposed compelling Section 2 interest is a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause.' That is true even when there is a compelling interest to
construct more Section 2 districts elsewhere in the state by use of
racial quotas.6 49  Creation of majority-minority districts in
benchmark districts should be allowed in those districts, if ever,
only when, contrary to current facts, they would be necessary in
those districts to give Blacks an equal electoral opportunity to elect
candidates of their choice.
But no such interest exists in benchmark districts. That is so
because the admitted racial classification triggers strict scrutiny.
Not only must the ends (of equal opportunity) be compelling, but
the means must be narrowly tailored. 65  For the benchmark
districts there was an entirely obvious alternative to racial quotas,
numerical targets, exclusion of White incumbents from districts
because of their race, and the rest. The State could simply have
maintained the crossover districts with whatever population
adjustments were needed, thus serving the objective of giving
minorities an equal opportunity to elect candidates of their choice
without the imposition of extreme racial quotas and numerical
targets, or the racial quota mandated exclusion from their prior
districts of White Democratic incumbents.
647. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1; N.C. CONST. art. II §§ 3, 5 (2013).
648. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
649. See Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 917 (1996) (discussing how a violation of
Section 2 in one area cannot be remedied by creating a safe majority-minority
district elsewhere in the state).
650. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2418-19 (2013)
(holding that any racial classification must meet strict scrutiny); Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (holding that all government classifications based on
race trigger strict scrutiny).
651. See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2419 (discussing how racial classifications will be
upheld only if they are narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental
interest).
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As this Article has argued, the history of race and politics in
North Carolina has been a long history of efforts to disrupt racial
coalitions, and to brand one party "the Black party" and to depress
or eliminate voting by African Americans. Nothing in the
Fourteenth Amendment or in Section 2, properly interpreted,
legitimizes the use of racial quotas, numerical targets, and racial
presumptions that Blacks must not be given the chance to prefer a
White candidate or vice versa-in order to disrupt effective multi-
racial coalitions.
The Supreme Court continues to maintain that racial quotas
and racial classifications are deeply suspect and only may be
upheld when they are narrowly tailored to further a compelling
state interest.654 That is so also in redistricting cases.65 5 However,
there is no compelling state interest in protecting the state from
Section 2 challenges to districts from which minority-preferred
candidates are being elected with coalition support, and therefore
districts in which the Gingles preconditions do not obtain.65 6 Nor is
the subsequent packing of Black votes into super-safe "steroid
districts" a remedy that is narrowly tailored to this
• 651
circumstance. Indeed the challenged benchmark districts that
the state transformed were quite safe Instead, the compelling
state interest here should have been the protection of multiracial
coalitions in which people of all races and backgrounds work
together, instead of systematically dismantling them. In this
652. See, e.g., supra Part III ("Post-Civil War and the 191h Century:
Reconstructions and the Reactions"); BECKEL, supra note 116, at 3; ESCOTT, supra
note 102, at 148; Pildes, supra note 117, at 302.
653. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2012).
654. See, e.g., Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2419; Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v.
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007); Johnson v. California, 543 U.S.
499, 505 (2005).
655. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993).
656. Compare Dickson v. Rucho, No. 11-CVS-16896, slip op. at 17 (N.C. Super.
Ct. July 8, 2013) (stating that to demonstrate a "compelling governmental interest"
the factual record must provide a "strong basis" for the General Assembly's
conclusion that the plans were reasonably necessary to avoid liability) (emphasis
added), with Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 31 (1986) ("Stated succinctly, a
bloc voting majority must usually be able to defeat candidates supported by a
politically cohesive, geographically insular minority group [to raise a claim under §
2]."), and Lichtman Second Aff. at 6, 7, Dickson v. Rucho, No. 11-CVS-16896 (N.C.
Super. Ct. 2012) (demonstrating the minority's preferred candidate was typically
successful in challenged districts with less than 50% BVAP).
657. See Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 23-24, 27 (2009) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring); cf Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 153-54 (1993). Contra Dickson
v. Rucho, No. 11-CVS-16896, at 34-36 (N.C. Super. Ct. July 8, 2013).
658. See Lichtman Second Aff. at 6, 7, Dickson v. Rucho, No. 11-CVS-16896
(N.C. Super. Ct. 2012).
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situation, the law should discourage the increased racial
polarization caused by racial quotas, numerical targets, and racial
exclusion of candidates from certain districts.
Unnecessary and extreme racial districting does more than
segregate Black voters into "steroid districts" with 50% or 50%+
Black voting age population. 9  And it does more than waste, for
no worthy purpose, Black votes by an extreme racial
classification.6  It helps to segregate White voters too. 1  It
contributes to bleaching other districts. 2 It exacerbates racial
isolation and exacerbates racial divisions.6 Charlie Cook notes in
his political report:
Between 2000 and 2010, the non-Hispanic White share of the
population fell from 69 percent to 64 percent, closely tracking
the 5-point drop in the White share of the electorate measured
by exit polls between 2004 and 2012. But after the post-census
redistricting and the 2012 elections, the non-Hispanic White
share of the average Republican House district jumped from
73 percent to 75 percent, and the average Democratic House
district declined from 52 percent White to 51 percent White. In
other words, while the country continues to grow more racially
diverse, the average Republican district continues to get even
Whiter.
In more racially segregated districts politicians are less likely
to pursue policies favored by most members of the excluded
groups, thus widening the racial divide. Both Black and White
districts become less representative of our multi-racial nation.6
Racial gerrymanders are not the only cause of this distressing
electoral segregation, but they are a contributing factor.
Gerrymanders and racially designed gerrymanders have
contributed to dysfunctional government. 7 It will be a perverse
659. See Voinovich, 507 U.S. at 153.
660. Id.
661. See Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 27 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe object of the VRA
will now be promoting racial blocs ... .
662. Id.
663. Id.
664. Charlie Cook, The GOP Keeps Getting Whiter, NAT'L J. (Mar. 14, 2013),
http ://www.nationaljournal.com/columns/cook-report/the-gop-keeps-getting-Whiter-
20130314.
665. See Jamie L. Carson et al., Redistricting and Party Polarization in the U.S.
House of Representatives, 35 AM. POL. RES. 878, 898-99 (2007). But see Nolan
McCarty et al., Does Gerrymandering Cause Polarization?, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 666
(2009).
666. Carson, supra note 665, at 880.
667. See id.; see generally THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT'S EVEN
WORSE THAN IT LOOKS: HOW THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED
WITH THE NEW POLITICS OF EXTREMISM (2013); Thomas L. Friedman, Our
[Vol. 33: 53
STRUGGLE FOR POLITICAL MASTERY
and sad day indeed if the Whole County Provision of the North
Carolina Constitution, a modest, partial safeguard against
gerrymanders of the state legislature, is voided to facilitate a
racial gerrymander.
Conclusion
The use of racial devices to prevent a possible majority of
voters from becoming a majority in legislatures-all in the quest
for political mastery-is with us still. Since Democrats today are a
multi-racial multi-ethnic party, since Blacks overwhelmingly vote
Democratic, and since the Black-White coalition has had some
success in North Carolina, devices aimed at Blacks and some
minorities (and others such as the poor or the young or the old) are
once again attractive to their political opponents." Manipulation
of electoral rules and targeted efforts to discourage people in the
other political party from voting by disproportionally depressing
voting by selected groups, including Black voters, is not new. 9
The anti-coalition Conservative-Democrats of the late 19th and
the early 20th centuries also crafted election laws that
disproportionately disadvantaged Blacks-as part of their effort to
end "Negro-Republican" rule. 70 The election "reforms" (no party
labels on ballots, no different colors, encouraging challenging
voters, and tests such as the demands for date and place of birth)
look facially neutral-and even reformist-when divorced from
their context. Most of us can see racial discrimination in the
distant past. Conservative-Democrats explicitly played the race
card early and often. 71 Today, tactics to undermine Black political
power and that of potential allies such as the poor and young or
elderly sometimes come wrapped in the rhetoric of civil rights.
7 2
Some methods of pursuing political mastery are different
from the past. Stuffing more Blacks into more majority-minority
districts to reduce overall Black power in the legislature and to
Democracy Is at Stake, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2013, at A23.
668. See Richard L. Hasen, Race or Party?: How Courts Should Think About
Republican Efforts to Make it Harder to Vote in North Carolina and Elsewhere, 127
HARV. L. REV. F. 58, 65 (2014).
669. See PERMAN, supra note 1.
670. Pildes, supra note 117, at 302.
671. Id.
672. See, e.g., David Zucchino, North Carolina Lawmakers Approve Sweeping
Voter ID Bill, L.A. TIMES (July 26, 2013), available at http://www.gopusa.com/news
/2013/07/29/north-carolina-lawmakers-approve-sweeping-voter-id-bill/ (noting the




eliminate as many of their White allies from the legislature as
possible-all under the cover of benefiting Blacks and complying
with the Voting Rights Act-may be a new twist. Other tactics are
the same, such as targeting the Black and Democratic vote for
diminution by election laws.
Admission that "reformers" are attempting to disfranchise
Black voters as Blacks or young voters as young or poor voters as
poor by facially-neutral means which disproportionally impact
Blacks, the poor, or younger voters, respectively, is rare. Instead,
supporters claim the laws are supported by good reasons-or at
least not wholly irrational ones. A second defense is that Blacks
are targeted along with others, not because they are Black, but
because they are Democrats and discrimination in voting laws
based on party is permissible, just as it seems to be for
districting.73 In contrast, North Carolina's post-Civil War anti-
coalition "Conservatives" (later called Democrats) overtly used
direct racial appeals; the call for White supremacy was a political
weapon in their campaigns. 74 That type of appeal is less socially
acceptable today.
The issue in Reconstruction and after, however, was never
simply race. The issue was a democracy made up of Blacks and
Whites, with Blacks targeted because they were easily identified
for disadvantage, and Whites targeted for being "Black
Republicans." Biracial coalitions remained a very serious political
threat until the early 1900s.1 5 The key goal of the "Conservatives"
of that earlier era was to disrupt this White-Black Republican
coalition.7  Success left the anti-coalition "Conservatives"
(morphed into anti-coalition Democrats) in a position of political
mastery for many years. As Professor Richard H. Pildes has
noted, the "[fMramers of disfranchisement were typically the most
conservative, large landowning, wealthy faction of the Democratic
Party....""' Those in the faction "were seeking to fend off
challenges from Republicans, Populists, and other third parties, as
well as from the more populist wings of the Democratic Party.
'6 78
Destruction of bi-racial coalitions was a disaster for Blacks; among
a myriad of other awful changes, it led to denials of basic legal
673. See Hasen, supra note 668, at 65.
674. See, e.g., Curtis, The Klan, supra note 117, at 1398-1425.
675. E.g., KOUSSER, supra note 227, at 25-26.
676. See, e.g., BECKEL, supra note 116, at 69-73; ESCOTT, supra note 102, at 154.
677. Pildes, supra note 117, at 302.
678. Id.
[Vol. 33: 53
STRUGGLE FOR POLITICAL MASTERY
rights and protections and, of course, to large discrepancies in the
state's expenditures for Black and White schools. 9
The Republican coalition and subsequent Republican-
Populist alliance faced severe internal problems. There were race
differences, class differences, and tensions between big-business
Republicans, less affluent farmers, and poor former slaves and
Populists."' Some Republicans were prejudiced, and some
conservative Republicans advocated becoming an all-White party
too
81
The proposal here confronts using racial quotas and
proportions today as a tool for political domination. It deals with
the case at hand and does so narrowly. It simply limits some
abuses under Section 2 and allows some previously existing multi-
racial coalitions to flourish and not be destroyed by racial quotas.
It involves the constitutionality of Section 2 as purportedly applied
by the legislature.
Rejecting these "steroid districts" does not give minorities
special advantages allowing them to achieve maximum political
power. It simply affords them the minimal constitutional
guarantee of the equal protection of the laws, protections
available, on the same basis, to persons and candidates of all
races, colors, and ethnic origins. There was a time when the
Supreme Court struck down a law passed by the Congress to ban
segregation in places of public accommodation. In doing so the
Court proclaimed:
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of
beneficent legislation has shaken off the inseparable
concomitants of that state, there must be some stage in the
progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of a mere
citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite of the laws and
... his rights as a citizen, or a man, are to be protected by the
679. See DAVISON M. DOUGLAS, READING, WRITING & RACE: THE
DESEGREGATION OF THE CHARLOTTE SCHOOLS 13-14 (1995) ("By the end of the first
decade of the twentieth century, the gap between [B]lack and [W]hite schools in
North Carolina was the greatest it had ever been. In 1910, [Bllack schools received
about 17 percent of total school monies, even though African Americans accounted
for about one-third of the school population."). Douglas argues that the amount of
money spent on African American students would continue to decline, such that by
1915, "the state spent an average $7.40 for each [W]hite child and $2.30 for each
[B]lack child." Id. at 14.
680. PERMAN, supra note 1, at 241.
681. See JOHN HALEY, CHARLES N. HUNTER AND RACE RELATIONS IN NORTH
CAROLINA 142 (60 James Sprunt Studies in History & Political Sci.) (1987) (stating
that by mid-1902 North Carolina Republicans "were well on their way toward
making their party an all-White organization").
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ordinary modes by which other men's rights are protected.6
Granting American citizens of different backgrounds,
including Americans of African descent, equal treatment in public
accommodations was not granting special protections to Blacks.6 3
Granting Americans of African descent protection against being
racially gerrymandered into electoral "steroid districts"-all done
in the interest of undermining the multi-racial coalition of which
they are a part-is not making them special favorites of the law
either.
As we have seen, the Court rejected a statutory right under
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act for minorities to establish
coalition districts-because the Gingles preconditions were not
met. It would be ironic if the Court were to hold that the
legislature has a right to destroy effective coalition districts
because of Section 2-even though the legislature's racial
gerrymander does not meet the Gingles preconditions. If that
were so, while minorities would have no special statutory right to
assistance in forming multi-racial and multi-ethnic coalitions, the
legislatures would have unique and special powers from Section 2
to justify destroying them.
The redistricting in this case faces courts and voters with an
existential challenge to a fair, just, and republican form of
government. The right to vote, to free speech, to associate, to form
coalitions including multi-racial coalitions, and to a system where
a majority-even a multi-racial and multi-ethnic majority-can
reasonably expect to be able to elect a majority of legislators are
sacred democratic values. 84 Using racial quotas to disrupt bi-
racial and multi-ethnic coalitions for partisan purposes does not
make the quotas constitutional. Claims that these "steroid
districts" (50% or 50%+ BVAP racially-constructed districts to
replace crossover or coalition districts where minority candidates
were winning handily with coalition votes) are pro-equality and
pro-democracy or are somehow a necessary device to advance the
interest of African Americans, or are necessary to create a "safe
harbor" for super-safe districts, are thin and cynical veneers.
682. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 31 (1883).
683. For an explanation of why the 1875 Civil Rights Act should not have been
read as exclusively protecting Blacks, see Curtis, Reflections on Albion Tourgee's
1896 View of the Supreme Court: A "Consistent Enemy of Personal Liberty and
Equal Right"?, supra note 117, at 59-60 (noting that the text and title of the Act
should be read to protect groups in addition to Blacks, especially given 191h Century
usage).
684. See U.S. CONST. amends. I, XIV, XV, XIX, XXIII, XIV.
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